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THE POLARIZATION OF REPRODUCTIVE AND
PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING
JAMIE R. ABRAMS ∗
ABSTRACT

Women’s abortion and parental decision-making in child rearing are constructed as polarized methods of decision-making in law, politics, and society. Women’s abortion decision-making
is understood as myopic and individualistic. Parental decision-making is understood as sacrificial and selfless. This polarization leaves reproductive decision-making isolated, marginalized,
and vulnerable while parental decision-making is essentialized, protected, and revered. Both
framings are inaccurate and problematic. A unified family decision-making framework that
aligns abortion decision-making and parental decision-making reveals that both forms of decision-making are more multi-dimensional, relational, and family-centered than currently understood. This Article exposes the ground to be gained by crossing longstanding boundaries in family law and reproductive rights to more accurately and inclusively frame decision-making. This is
a critical step to pull abortion decision-making from its marginalized periphery and reposition it
as complex, imperfect, family-focused, and central to family law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article reveals worrisome inaccuracies in how we understand
and frame abortion decision-making. It particularly reveals a problematic polarization in how abortion decision-making is framed compared to parental decision-making, a polarization distinguished between “autono(me)” and “autono(thee)” decision-making. It concludes
that autono(me) is the troublesome framework by which a woman is
inaccurately perceived to universally make abortion decisions exclusively in a myopic lens, focused only on her own needs or wants.
However, strong data exists supporting that a women’s actual decision-making lens often focuses squarely on existing children. This
framing ignores how women make reproductive decisions in an autono(thee) and, more often, in an autono(we) lens. Autono(thee), in
contrast, is the troublesome framework by which the law wrongly
pretends that parents exclusively make decisions in a myopic lens
focused only on the Best Interests of the Child (BIOC). This framing
ignores the ways in which parents can also make decisions in an autono(me) and, more often, in an autono(we) lens. This polarized framing marginalizes women’s abortion decision-making as anomalously
self-centered, callous, and gendered when compared to the ordinary
decision-making framework of parents.1
A unified decision-making framework grounded in family law
would yield a more accurate, inclusive, destigmatized framing. 2 Proposing a unified framework to understand and describe parental and
abortion decision-making disrupts longstanding boundaries in reproductive politics and core organizing principles of family law. 3 It is virtually unprecedented within reproductive rights scholarship or advocacy to speak of reproductive rights in the same conversation as “parents” or “children.” 4 This is for fear that such categorizations would
1. See generally Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. CR.-C.L. L.
REV. 409, 439 (2013) (arguing that “abortion disgust” derives from “women engaging in
gender-atypical behavior”).
2. Importantly, as discussed more thoroughly below, the question of abortion
decision-making can be tethered to family law regardless of one’s political perspective on
abortion. While this Article is candidly written from the perspective of advancing the
reproductive rights movement, this Article targets the methodology of how decision-making
is framed in law and society more than the substance of the decision itself.
3. See, e.g., KATHLEEN MCDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHOICE: A FEMINIST REEXAMINES ABORTION 21 (1984) (observing, over thirty years ago, that the “feminist
discourse on abortion has changed little” (emphasis added)). While feminist theory has
done great work to expand, develop, and mature in the areas of violence, for example, it
has remained more static on the issue of abortion. Id. at 22-23.
4. See Rachel K. Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like, Everything in the
World”: How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who Have Abortions, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES
79, 79-80 (2008) (“In the prevailing discourse on abortion in the United States, abortion and
motherhood are often regarded as opposing interests, and it is typically assumed that women
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subject women as reproductive decision-makers to the same obligations and state oversight that parents have. This Article does not
seek to apply parental standards or obligations to a woman’s decision
to terminate a pregnancy, but it seeks to comparatively analyze how
both types of decisions are made to debunk myths and to destigmatize abortion decision-making.5
Part II sets out the polarized framings that currently dominate
and divide abortion decision-making and parental decision-making.
Part III explains the ways in which these framings are inaccurate
and problematic and makes the case for a unified framing of family
decision-making. This framing inclusively acknowledges that both
parental decision-making and abortion decision-making have aspects
of autono(me), autono(thee), and autono(we) lenses. Part IV explains
why this approach is needed and how a revised strategic framing
would build bridges instead of walls, and strengthen credibility and
inclusivity in the reproductive rights movement. 6
II. THE POLARIZATION OF AUTONO(ME) AND AUTONO(THEE)
Women’s abortion decision-making and parental decision-making in
child-rearing are constructed as polarized processes. Women’s abortion
decision-making is understood as myopic and individualistic, and parental decision-making is understood as sacrificial and selfless. This
polarization leaves reproductive decision-making isolated, marginalized, and vulnerable while parental decision-making is essentialized
and revered. Both framings are inaccurate and problematic.

A. The Marginalized Autono(me) Framing of Women’s
Abortion Decision-Making
The autono(me) framing largely dominates legal, political, and
social discourses of women’s abortion decision-making. The language
of “autono(me)” depicts how “autonomy” legal framings are overlaid
with problematic connotations and perceptions suggesting that this
decision-making is myopic and individualistic.
who obtain abortions do not want to be mothers, at least not at the time of the abortion,
because they are unable or unwilling to assume the responsibilities of raising a child.”).
5. See generally Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?: Gonzales v. Carhart and
the Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 14 (2008) (“One
of the problems we will face in explaining women’s decision-making, though, is the lack of
information people have about the process and the assumptions that grow in that void,
assumptions fueled by the anti-abortion movement’s widespread and well-funded
disinformation campaigns.”).
6. See, e.g., Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 327, 327-35 (2013) (examining the development and interconnections among
reproductive health, reproductive rights, and reproductive justice movements).
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The “pro-choice” movement has worked to frame and protect a
woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Advocates his-

torically were driven to respond to the “pro-life” framing with an accessible, understandable framing, and the “right to choose” prevailed.7 This language of choice was a critical historic pivot from the
early efforts to frame abortion as an issue of public health—a framing that activists have staunchly sought to return to in modern
times.8 This language of “choice” versus “life” has critically “co-opted
the hard fact that” a woman may terminate a pregnancy to save her
own life. 9 This language of choice was then enshrined in Roe v.
Wade.10 This language explains the legal roots of the right, but it
oversimplifies and essentializes how the decisions are made. It is too
narrow of a frame.11 This framing has had critical “staying power”
over several decades, a point that legal historian Mary Ziegler argues
merits a “fuller account.” 12 This Article seeks to expand that account
as to the decision-making it depicts.

7. LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 33-34 (2012)
(providing the historic documentation of Jimmye Kimmey offering the options of “Freedom
of Conscience” and “Right to Choose”).
8. See id. at ix (explaining how the claims for liberalizing abortion law “in the name
of public health gave way over time to claims of the women’s movement seeking for women
liberty, equality, and dignity: women’s right to control their own bodies and lives; to have
their voices and decisions treated with respect; and to participate as equals in private and
public life”); see, e.g., About Us, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., http://www.reproductiverights.org/
about-us [https://perma.cc/C7JQ-JGRY] (helping women realize their “right to reproductive
health and autonomy” and fighting globally to advance women’s reproductive health,
self-determination, and dignity as basic human rights); PLANNED PARENTHOOD ACTION
FUND, https://secure.ppaction.org/ (last visited August 22, 2016) (emphasizing its work
on reproductive health).
9. Nicole Huberfeld, With Liberty and Access for Some: The ACA’s Disconnect for
Women’s Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1361 (2013) (noting that prohibiting access
to abortions thus can threaten the life of pregnant women too).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING
ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 117 (1990) (“[T]he vocabularies of
both Life and Choice became partially entrenched in the law, although in different ways
and covering different territories.”).
11. See Reproductive Justice Media Reference Guide, FORWARD TOGETHER,
https://forwardtogether.org/tools/media-guide-abortion-latinx-community/ (last visited Feb.
22, 2017) (explaining how mainstream media coverage focuses narrowly on a “single
‘choice’ framework” that has “limited the media coverage of many other reproductive rights
and health issues”). See generally Luna & Luker, supra note 6, at 328 (highlighting how
the reproductive justice movement “called for recognition of the limitations of emphasizing
choice, which had largely come to mean the choice to have an abortion”).
12. MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 232
(2015). For example, Ziegler explores: “Has the choice framework varied in influence, or
have supporters of legal abortion challenged, reshaped, and revived it? What can abortionrights activists do, if anything, to move away from this approach? Like single-issue politics,
the idea of a right to choose has a long and complicated history.” Id. at 232-33.
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This framing has perpetuated misperceptions of how women make
abortion decisions. Consider as a starting point all of the problematic
ways in which abortion decision-making is framed solely around autono(me) in the following quote:
A woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy is both empowering
and liberating. It empowers her because her choice acknowledges
that she understands her options, her current situation, and her
future expectations, and she is able to make a fully informed decision about what would most benefit her and act on it. It liberates
her because she can regain control of her reproductive system and
chart her destiny without an unwanted child in tow. It liberates
her to fully care for her existing family, her career, her emotional
and mental well-being, and her goals. 13

This quote uses “her” or “she” seventeen times to refer to the decision! It positions the pregnant woman as a mirror, and her decisionmaking methodology only focuses on herself and her needs. In contrast, as explored more below, parental decision-making is positioned
as an external scope in which parents look out at their children.
While this account may explain some abortion decision-making, it is
not a universal or fully descriptive account, yet it dominates mainstream political, legal, and social framings.
This autono(me) framing is perpetuated, for example, in laws governing minor’s access to abortion bypassing parental consent. While
the exact standards applied to minors seeking a judicial bypass of
parental consent vary from state to state, fifteen states use a BIOC
standard to focus exclusively on whether a judicial bypass is in the
interest of the minor.14 This considers explicitly whether the abortion
is in the minor’s best interests. This perpetuates the idea that girls
are making this decision in an exclusively individualistic manner,
without the context of family, community, and existing children.
This autono(me) framing can be used to troublesome legal and political ends. It distorts the methodology of abortion decision-making
by stripping it of any perspectives of the needs of others or the interconnected relationships involved. A South Carolina court of appeals
decision reveals the harsh consequences of an exclusive (and even
derogatory) autono(me) frame. In Purser v. Owens, the family court
13. Henry Morgentaler, Abortion Is a Moral Choice, in THE ETHICS OF ABORTION 13,
21 (Jennifer A. Hurley ed., 2001) (emphasis added).
Involvement
in
Minors’
Abortions,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
14. Parental
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions
[https://perma.cc/HKT8-FMCB]. All states provide a mechanism for a minor bypass. Some
states particularly instruct judges to use the BIOC standard to grant this relief. Satsie
Veith, The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents’ Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the
“Maturity” Standard, HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 453 (1994).

1286

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1281

considered a custody dispute between the mother and father of an
autistic child. 15 The couple had never married.16 The father had irregular contact with the child and paid child support voluntarily for
the first several years of his son’s life, but after a remarriage, he began more consistent contact in 2005. 17 The mother was the child’s
primary caretaker for his entire life, including extensive speech and
occupational therapy.18 In 2006, the mother became pregnant with
her current boyfriend and elected to terminate the pregnancy.19 She
testified that the abortion was because the second child had a 50%
chance of also having autism and “she felt a second child would take
away her focus from [the existing] [c]hild, and [her] [b]oyfriend was
not someone she wanted involved in her and [the existing] [c]hild’s
lives anymore.” 20 The family court awarded custody to the father, despite findings that the mother was fit and the primary caretaker.21
The court explicitly expressed concern with the pregnancy and abortion: “That was an irresponsible decision; two irresponsible decisions.
First being involved with a 19 year old when you are 36 or 35. That’s
irresponsible. And then having an abortion. That’s irresponsible. I
am concerned about the environment.” 22
Here, the mother paid a steep cost for an autono(me) lens, as the
court perceived it. Because she had made what the judge perceived to
be “irresponsible” decisions, she lost custody of her child. When the
trial court saw her decision in a demonized autono(me) frame, it saw
it also as fundamentally inconsistent with parenting decisionmaking, without regard to how she had actually cared for and raised
her child who was the subject of the litigation.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the family court
erred in considering the mother’s abortion. 23 Rather, her decision
“had no direct or indirect effect on [the existing] [c]hild and therefore
was not relevant to the custody determination.” 24 The court of appeals remanded for consideration excluding this evidence. 25 It reframed the mother’s decision as one focused on the well-being of her
existing child and acting in his best interests. The court of appeals,
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Purser v. Owens, 722 S.E.2d 225, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).

Id. at 225.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.

2017] REPRODUCTIVE AND PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING

1287

thus, reframed her decision around what the next Section will describe as an autono(thee) lens. This autono(thee) and/or autono(we)
lens considered her existing child’s needs, the impact that a second
autistic child would have on her first child, and the role of the second
child’s father in their lives.
As Purser’s family court opinion reveals, this exclusive autono(me)
framing can be misperceived and distorted. It can create an inaccurate framing of women’s abortion decision-making as narrowly focused on themselves in the abstract. The “right-to-life” movement has
seized on this framing and pushed forward descriptions of abortion
decision-making as driven by “convenience” and “self-development.” 26
The marginalization and demonization of an exclusive autono(me)
framework are perhaps well reflected in Pope Francis’s recent remarks stating that the decision not to have children is a “selfish
choice.” 27 The “Silent No More” movement has likewise leveraged this
frame of abortion as an inherently selfish act and urged women to
come forward and explain it as such. 28 And accordingly, this political
framing has yielded notable political traction in which many Americans do disapprove of abortion for the self-development (e.g., career
or schooling) of the pregnant woman. 29
Critically, this individual autonomy framing contrasts with other
approaches, such as the legal rules governing abortion in England.
The 1967 Abortion Act, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act of 1990, makes abortion legal up to twenty-four
weeks under certain circumstances.30 Those circumstances include
when two doctors agree in good faith that “continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman or any existing children of her family.” 31 The statute further
26. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1559, 1578 (1991).
27. David Gibson, Pope Francis: ‘Not to Have Children Is a Selfish Choice,’
H UFFINGTON P OST (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/12/
pope-francis-children_n_6671464.html [https://perma.cc/Z95F-528X] (“Life rejuvenates and
acquires energy when it multiplies: It is enriched, not impoverished!” (quoting Pope Francis)).
28. Why We Chose Abortion: Susan and Hrach Share Their Story, SILENT NO MORE,
http://www.silentnomoreawareness.org/testimonies/testimony5235.htm [https://perma.cc/
6UVV-SGG3] (quoting one narrative that the reason a woman had three abortions was “I
selfishly wanted my career, educational plans and my relationships to remain unchanged,”
and another husband explaining that “[t]he reason I encouraged her was selfishness. I
wanted our new marriage to get off the ground without being hindered in any way. I also
did not want our professional and travel plans to be steered off course.”).
29. Williams, supra note 26, at 1583.
30. Abortion Act 1967, in FRANCES BURTON, CORE STATUTES ON FAMILY LAW, 25
(2016-2017).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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allows that when determining the risks, “account may be taken of the
pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.”32
Under this model, there is arguably no individual autonomy at all because the doctors make the ultimate decision. This framing is subject
to its own critiques, including that it arguably positions women as either “too selfish or too irrational to be left to make her own decision,”
and that it still positions maternity as the norm for women and abortion as the exception.33 It does, however, position abortion decisionmaking as a decision to be understood in a contextual family frame.
The exclusive autono(me) frame positions women—and only women—to have to defend their decisions from dominant hierarchies, requiring women’s decision-making to be uniquely selfless and sacrificial.34 Gonzales v. Carhart particularly revealed how demonized an
autono(me) frame can become and how it can be contrasted starkly
with women’s roles as “natural” caregivers. 35 Gonzales challenged the
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Act. 36 It revealed that
the Court still understood the woman’s right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy as a decision that occurred in consultation with her
doctor. 37 The Court’s rhetorical language revealed its view that “doctors” protect fetal interests, “abortion doctors” protect women’s autonomy, that women are naturally destined as mothers, and women
who seek to terminate a pregnancy need to be protected.38 It suggests
that abortion is not healthcare and that women need to be “protected
from providers” who might fail to inform or guide them properly in
their decision.39 This is a distinctly “woman-protective argument.”40
The Court suggested that it was not just that women need to be protected from poor decision-making; it is that women who seek to exer32. Id.
33. Sally Sheldon, The Abortion Act 1967: A Critical Perspective, in ABORTION LAW
AND POLITICS TODAY 43, 49 (Ellie Lee ed., 1998).
34. See CONDIT, supra note 10, at 180 (“As American society and public discourse
have been constituted, women must justify their own moral principles as they apply them
because these principles and the female interests they represent have not become publicly
accepted maxims. . . . [leaving women to] then negotiate between ‘their’ principles and the
dominant principles.”).
35. 550 U.S. 124, 125 (2007).
36. Id. at 124.
37. See generally id.
38. See id. at 159-60 (“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the
course of their medical practice, nor should it elevate their status above other physicians in
the medical community.”)
39. Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 405 (2013) (explaining how Gonzales and Casey have positioned “abortion exclusively as a right of choice, uncoupled from healthcare” (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124, and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992)).
40. Id. at 410.
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cise their decision-making autonomy in any way other than with a
fetal focus are in need of protective barriers. It is a false choice for
women: either act to protect fetal life, or the state needs to protect
you from your decision-making.41
This Article critiques the essentialized view that all women make
decisions using one particular lens. While some women do make reproductive decisions in an autono(me) lens, it is important that the
law acknowledge that not all women or all decisions sit in this frame
or in any one frame alone. 42 This conclusion is explored more fully in
the Section below.

B. The Dominant Autono(thee) Framing of
Parental Decision-Making
In stark contrast, the BIOC legal standard perpetuates an essentialized inaccuracy that parents act myopically in the best interests of
their children. It is not just that this narrative exists, but that it is
revered and accepted as universal. This, in turn, perpetuates the myth
that parents always subordinate their interests to their children. A
narrative suggesting that parental rights have been subordinated to
children’s interests dominates family law, but it is not fully accurate or
descriptive.43 This Section explores the legal standard and the false
premise that it explains parental decision-making universally.

1. The BIOC Standard
The BIOC standard perpetuates a view that is squarely focused on
the children’s interests—in stark contrast to the individual rights of
the parents. This view may be generally accurate in describing state
interventions, but even then, it is not consistently accurate, and it is
not accurate for all parental decision-making. The BIOC standard is

41. Id. (“[T]he woman-protective argument conflates healthcare and choice: A woman
must be protected from the abortion decision because the choice is harmful to her physical
and mental health.”).
42. See, e.g., Kate Cockrill & Tracy A. Weitz, Abortion Patients’ Perceptions of Abortion
Regulation, 20 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 12, 14 (2010) (“The reasons for choosing abortion
among the women in our sample were diverse, but for most they matched the general
categories identified in recent research ‘that having a child would interfere with a woman’s
education, work or ability to care for dependents; that she could not afford a baby now; and
that she did not want to be a single mother or was having relationship problems.’ ”). Consider,
for example, a woman who terminates her pregnancy to save her own life. These women do
not feel that they have exercised their autonomy or made a choice at all. See MCDONNELL,
supra note 3, at 35.
43. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 133 (2014).
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consistently extended to many different family law settings, including custody and visitation. 44
The BIOC standard is the “touchstone” underlying custody law in
the United States and globally.45 The history of custody law is, at bottom, a debate about whose rights—children, parents, moms, or dads—
should be given “paramount consideration.”46 It is generally understood to have “at least as many weaknesses as it does strengths.” 47
Custody law has changed dramatically throughout history from a
property interest to a fundamental constitutional right, and from a
gendered to a gender-neutral standard. 48 The BIOC standard distinctly emerged as the touchstone of family law, hallmarked by the
release of the 1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act’s BIOC factors. 49 The gender-neutral BIOC standard replaced the earlier eras of
gendered presumptions.50

44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 752.011 (2016) (applying the BIOC standard to grandparent
visitation); R.S. v. J.S., 457 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing the Missouri statute
requiring the court to consider the BIOC when modifying a prior custody decree); Brian Bix,
Best Interests of the Child 2 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 08-08, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092544.
See generally Lahny R. Silva, The Best Interest Is the Child: A Historical Philosophy for
Modern Issues, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 415 (2014) (arguing that the BIOC standard should be
reframed and applied even beyond family law to the juvenile justice system).
45. Caroline Simon, The ‘Best Interests of the Child’ in a Multicultural Context: A
Case Study, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 175, 180 (2015) (“The notion of the
BIC is today one of the most often mobilised concepts in national and international children’s rights and family law.”).
46. Erin Bajackson, Note, Best Interests of the Child—A Legislative Journey Still in
Motion, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 311, 311-12 (2013) (noting that this question has
“sparked a firestorm of legislation”).
47. See id. at 311 (summarizing that “[a]t best it can be described as a fact-driven process that most accurately protects a child’s physical, psychological, and emotional needs [and
a]t worst it has been deemed an egocentric, utilitarian product of the state’s design to make
children productive members of society rather than burdens upon it later in life,” ultimately
concluding that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes (footnotes omitted)).
48. Custody was presumptively given to fathers, historically aligning with
understandings of children as property and the lack of legal identity of women. Linda D.
Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The
Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 390-91 (2008). In time, this
presumption shifted to a gendered presumption that women were more appropriate
caretakers of children of young ages. Id. at 391. This maternal presumption was entirely
gone by the 1970s. Id. This presumption was particularly applied for children of “tender
years,” often considered to be children under seven years old. Kelly Schwartz, Note, The

Kids Are Not All Right: Using the Best Interest Standard to Prevent Parental Alienation
and a Therapeutic Intervention Approach to Provide Relief, 56 B.C. L. REV. 803, 815-16

(2015). Fathers, however, were still presumed to be the presumptive best custodians of
children beyond their formative years. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 314 (noting that these
presumptions could be overcome with factual findings of unfitness).
49. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 314-15 (explaining that factors contributing to the shift
to female favoritism include “the industrial revolution, the women’s rights movement, and
changes in the field of psychology” (quoting Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, A Custody System
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The BIOC standard directs judges to focus squarely on the perspective of the children.51 While the exact factors vary from state to
state, the core factors allow states to consider the wishes of the
child’s parents; the wishes of the child; the interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings, and any other persons
who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; and the mental
and physical health of all parties. 52 No one factor is considered dispositive in identifying the child’s best interests.53 Typically, the only
evidence that is not admissible in determining the BIOC is evidence
that does not have a nexus to the child, such as the sexual activity of
a parent that does not impact the child. 54 Courts deploy experts and
consider a broad range of factors that are all narrowly focused on answering the “central concern” of the child’s best interests. 55 In a
Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions
for a More Protective and Equitable Custody System, 88 KY. L.J. 761, 768 (2000))).
50. Elrod & Dale, supra note 48, at 392 (“The impact of child custody law’s paradigm shift

to the gender-neutral best interests of the child standard in the 1970s almost defies description. Rather than basing custody decisions on gender- or status-based presumptions, judges
were suddenly charged with making individualized determinations without presumptions or a
clear default position.”). But see Bajackson, supra note 46, at 312-15 (noting that some men
and men’s rights groups argue that gender neutrality has not been achieved and that the maternal presumption still influences courts); Elizabeth Gresk, Opposing Viewpoints: Best Interests of the Child vs. the Fathers’ Rights Movement, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 390, 391 (2013)
(“[T]he tender years doctrine sill influences decisions made in family courts. . . . [M]others are
overwhelmingly favored as primary custodians for children.”).
51. Bix, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that this emphasis is distinctly not focused on the
“claims and interests of other parties,” such as the parents).
52. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5328 (2016). The inclusion of the children’s wishes
in the custody decision-making framework marked a historic development in custody law
away from children as property to children as autonomous beings. Bajackson, supra note
46, at 317 (“This factor [reflects] an important leap forward from the presumption periods
defining a child’s worth as a piece of owned property to a more even playing field that puts
children’s rights more in line with those enjoyed by their parents.”).
53. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17(b)(1) (2016) (“The court may not use one factor to
the exclusion of all others, and the court shall consider that the factors may be
interrelated.”). “The court may not focus on a single factor to the exclusion of all others. ‘In
the search for an appropriate custodial placement, the primary focus of the court is the best
interests of the child, the child’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and
in the continuity and stability of its environment.’ ” Gilbert v. Gilbert, No. 093459, 1996
WL 494080, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1996) (quoting Cappetta v. Cappetta, 490 A.2d
996, 999 (Conn. 1985)).
54. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 315-22 (explaining that the court should not consider
the conduct of a custodian that does not affect his relationship with the child). See generally MINN. STAT. § 518.17(b)(3) (“In assessing whether parents are capable of sustaining
nurturing relationships with their children, the court shall recognize that there are many
ways that parents can respond to a child’s needs with sensitivity and provide the child love
and guidance, and these may differ between parents and among cultures.”).
55. See, e.g., Landwehr v. Landwehr, 442 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“The
best interest of the child is not merely an important consideration in modification proceedings . . . it is the trial court’s central concern.” (quoting Soehlke v. Soehlke, 398 S.W.3d 10,
15 (Mo. 2013))).
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sense, the standard thus functions more like a process or decisionmaking methodology than a definition. 56
Given its breadth and fact-specific nature,57 implementation has
proven more difficult and indeterminate. The standard relies heavily
on trial court findings of fact to which appellate courts give great deference. 58 The standard positions judges to make BIOC determinations. Accordingly, critics argue that the standard can often hide judicial bias and promote “arbitrary and inconsistent decisionmaking.” 59 This oft-cited quote summarizes the challenges:
Finding the best interests of the child is an attractive public policy
and a lofty objective, but it is a difficult operational standard.
When compared to the legal presumptions it replaced, the best interests standard has been assailed as indeterminate and unpredictable. Judges, without the requisite training in child development and adequate resources to fully investigate these intensely
fact-sensitive cases, tend to rely on their own values. 60

Some criticize whether judges are actually prioritizing the children’s
best interests. Others suggest that the standard is applied in a way
that privileges women and harms men; conversely, some suggest the
standard is applied in a way that harshly judges and punishes mothers, while applying disproportionately lenient standards for fathers.61

56. Simon, supra note 45, at 180 (summarizing Belgian family justice and noting that
“no one can legitimately claim to know a priori what is in the child’s best interests”).
57. See, e.g., Noland-Vance v. Vance, 321 S.W.3d 398, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“There
is no absolute set of rules to follow when awarding child custody; each case must be
examined in light of its own set of unique facts.” (quoting In re Marriage of Barton, 158
S.W.3d 879, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005))).
58. See, e.g., R.S. v. J.S., 457 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that the
appellate court must give “great deference” to the trial court’s determination); NolandVance, 321 S.W.3d at 403 (“Because a trial court is vested with considerable discretion in
determining custody questions, an appellate court should not overturn the trial court’s
findings unless they are manifestly erroneous and the child’s welfare compels a different
result. . . . ‘We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court so long as credible
evidence supports the trial court’s beliefs.’ ” (citations omitted)). “Greater deference is given
to a trial court’s decision in matters involving child custody than in any other type of case.”
Id. (explaining that this is because of the trial court’s unique ability to “assess the credibility of the witnesses, along with their character, sincerity, and other intangibles not completely revealed by the record”).
59. Bix, supra note 44, at 2; see also June Carbone, Legal Applications of the “Best

Interest of the Child” Standard: Judicial Rationalization or a Measure of Institutional
Competence?, 134 PEDIATRICS S111, S117 (2014) (“Moreover, however easy it is to posit

cases in which the courts and other third parties should intervene to protect children’s
interests, it is equally possible to point to other cases in which such interventions reflect
judicial bias.”).
60. Elrod & Dale, supra note 48, at 392-93 (footnotes omitted).
61. See HASDAY, supra note 43, at 141.
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Criticisms and obstacles notwithstanding, the BIOC standard
applies throughout the world 62 and has been embedded in international human rights documents. 63 It holds great longevity, breadth,
and acceptance.

2. The Premise of Autono(thee) Parental Decision-Making
The BIOC standard is not just relevant to state interventions.
The Supreme Court has further concluded that this standard, as
implemented in the United States, is premised on the conclusion
that parents—like the state—make decisions focused on their children’s best interests.
Troxel v. Granville 64 reveals this premise of parental decisionmaking in the BIOC. 65 In Troxel, Tommie Granville sought to limit
and restrict the visitation terms and conditions of Jennifer and Gary
Troxel, the parents of the children’s deceased biological father, Brad
Troxel. 66 The children’s grandparents wanted greater visitation, closer to the visitation terms that the children’s father had before his suicide. 67 The trial court made factual findings relating to the mother’s
wish to establish a unified, blended family with the children she had
with Brad Troxel, her children from a prior marriage, her child in her
current marriage, and the children of her current husband. This required extensive coordination and effort. 68 Tommie’s reasons for limiting the Troxel’s visitation were very much grounded in the chil62. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, 1557 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC] (applying the
best interests of the child standard as the primary standard). See generally KAREN WELLS,
CHILDHOOD IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 15-21 (2d ed. 2015) (highlighting the emergence of
international law frameworks for regulating the protection of children).
63. CRC, supra note 62, art. 3 (“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”); Bajackson, supra note 46, at 351; Jason M. Pobjoy, The Best Interests of the Child
Principle as an Independent Source of International Protection, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
327, 328 (2015) (explaining that the BIOC standard embodied in the CRC is “playing an
increasingly significant role in decisions involving the admission or removal of a child
from a host State”).
64. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
65. Ariela R. Dubler, Constructing the Modern American Family: The Stories of
Troxel v. Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, 108 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008) (“[Justice
O’Connor] frames this story as a rather ordinary tale of family disagreement . . . .”).
66. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61.
67. See id.
68. Dubler, supra note 65, at 103 (“Indeed, through Tommie’s testimony, the
complicated logistics of the Wynn family emerged in full: Ryan and Kevin Wynn were with
Tommie and Kelly every other weekend; Jessie and Hallie Granville were with them every
Saturday through Wednesday; Roth Granville was with them every Tuesday . . . ; and, of
course, Riley always lived with them.”). This family composition left “twelve adults who
considered themselves grandparents to the children.” Id.
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dren’s needs, but also family unity and straightforward parenting
logistics. The trial court judge wrongly viewed the dispute as one between the biological mom and the grandparents, with each positioned
equally in their respective interests. 69 The trial judge ruled that it
was in the BIOC to spend “quality time” with their grandparents.70
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion for the Supreme
Court. She concluded that the trial court had erred in giving “no special weight at all to [the mother’s] determination of her daughters’
best interests.” 71 Absent a finding of fitness, the court should have
given deference to the mother’s analysis of what was in her children’s
best interests. Thus, the fundamental right that the Court recognizes
as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by [the] Court” 72 was premised on the conclusion “that a fit parent
will act in the best interest of his or her child.”73 The Court held:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e.,
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family to further question the ability
of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of
that parent’s children. 74

One Supreme Court case explained:
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 75

This critical threshold premise has been the guiding principle as
states consider the constitutionality of their third-party visitation
laws after Troxel. For example, when California considered the constitutionality of its nonparental visitation statute, it emphasized that
Troxel held that parents’ fundamental rights are threatened when
the “court exercises this discretion to substitute its own judgment of
a child’s best interests for that of a competent custodial parent.” 76
The threshold presumption these courts make is that fit parents do
act in the best interests of their children. 77
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, 66-67.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 69; Dubler, supra note 65, at 109.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 68.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1109.
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The premise of the BIOC standard—that parents universally and
exclusively act in the best interests of their children—inaccurately
frames parental decision-making around a lens of autono(thee) parental decision-making. Critically, the BIOC standard is not necessarily the standard that all parents use when they make day-to-day
parenting decisions free from state oversight or intervention. Perpetuating this myth is surely detrimental to parents, particularly mothers, but deeply detrimental to normative framings of women’s abortion decision-making.
The premise that parents make decisions always and narrowly in
the BIOC is not necessarily descriptive of how parental decisionmaking actually occurs. Although it may certainly express the state’s
normative goals for parenting behaviors, the BIOC standard is not
scientifically studied, taught to parents, or empirically supported. 78
Rather, while parents make decisions every day on behalf of their
children, “surprisingly little work has addressed the process by which
parents make decisions for their children.” 79 In particular, “no work
has systemically examined how parents’ decisions for their children
differ from how they decide for themselves in identical situations”—a
critical area of inquiry relevant to this Article.80 Even if work had
been done, parenting norms change by historical period and across
geographies and cultures. 81 Consider, for example, differences in
feeding and sleeping practices, discipline, employment, and marriage
age, to name a few. Most existing work chronicles how parents make
certain types of decisions, such as medical and childcare, but not systemically how they make decisions for their children as compared to
for themselves. 82
Parenting, particularly in Western cultures, is done in relative
isolation.83 It is done with relatively little training, guidance, educa-

78. See VAL GILLIES, MARGINALISED MOTHERS: EXPLORING WORKING-CLASS
EXPERIENCES OF PARENTING 156 (2007) (presenting research that “seriously undermines
the notion that mothering skills are universal, easily abstracted and able to be neutrally
conveyed in the form of parenting classes”).
79. Rebecca A. Dore et al., A Social Values Analysis of Parental Decision Making, 148
J. PSYCHOL. 477, 477 (2014) (concluding this lack of work is “unfortunate”).
80. Id. at 478 (anticipating that parents would be more risk-averse on behalf of
their children).
81. SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 21 (1996) (“At
any given time and place one particular model tends to take precedence over all others.
American mothers and fathers, just like parents of other times and places, are likely to
recognize this dominant model of appropriate child rearing and feel pressed to adopt or
reject it in whole or in part.”).
82. Dore et al., supra note 79, at 480.
83. TINA MILLER, MAKING SENSE OF MOTHERHOOD: A NARRATIVE APPROACH 113
(2005) (concluding that mothers do not “admit how burdensome the constraints and diffi-
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tion, or support. 84 Despite a proliferation of “how to” books on parenting, interest and research in parental development is relatively underdeveloped. 85 Setting aside “computer-like images of thinking” is
thus important in understanding parenting. 86 Any framing of standardized parenting wrongly suggests that parenting is essentialized
across race, class, age, gender, and immigration status.87
Even when parents have the best interests of their children at
heart, that does not necessarily translate into the ability to act on the
parent’s determination of the best interests of their children. 88 Rather, parental decision-making is often more survivalist within a
“limited framework of choices and opportunities.” 89 For example, the
decision of what form of childcare is in the BIOC is constrained by
“family finances, inflexible work schedules, and limited availability of
suitable options” and differs according to “parents’ preferences, values, and worries,” all of which factor into their decision-making.90
Economics scholarship studying how families allocate resources and
make decisions further reveals these complexities. 91
Finally, family law scholars have also long recognized that even
the state is not well-equipped to make BIOC determinations, no matculties of their condition can be,” as the children are in a relatively private and isolated
sense that “perpetuate[s] self-reliance”).
84. MARVIN J. FINE, PARENTS VS. CHILDREN: MAKING THE RELATIONSHIP WORK 168
(1979) (“Parents seem to have been a forgotten group in relation to their education. Our society has treated parenthood as something that people learn about automatically; yet many of us
found ourselves less than adequately prepared for the day-to-day challenges of parenthood.”).
85. See Jack Demick, Stages of Parental Development, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING
389, 408-09 (Marc H. Bornstein ed., 2d ed. 2002) (noting the lack of research suggests that
“how-to” books should be reviewed cautiously).
86. Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Parents’ Knowledge and Expectations: Using What We
Know, in HANDBOOK OF PARENTING, supra note 85, at 439, 456.
87. See generally LAURA ELDER & STEVEN GREENE, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLITICIZATION AND POLARIZATION OF THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (2012) (summarizing research concluding that parenthood is political and that it
differs by gender, class, etc.); HAYS, supra note 81, at 76 (“Every mother’s ideas about
mothering are shaped by a complex map of her class position, race, ethnic heritage, religious background, political beliefs, sexual preferences, physical abilities or disabilities,
citizenship status, participation in various subcultures, places of residence, workplace environment, formal education, the techniques her own parents used to raise her—and
more.”); MILLER, supra note 83, at 6 (“[M]otherhood is differently patterned and shaped in
different contexts.”).
88. See, e.g., KAREN WELLS, CHILDHOOD IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 11 (2015) (“[A]
protected, nurturing childhood has been available only to a minority of elite . . . children.”).
89. GILLIES, supra note 78, at 159.
90. Laura Sosinsky, How Parents Make Child Care Decisions, CHILD TRENDS:
BLOG (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.childtrends.org/how-parents-make-child-care-decisions/
[https://perma.cc/2GMX-2XNQ].
91. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (analyzing family life
with a rational choice approach); Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962).
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ter how noble its objectives might be. Not trained in the “dynamics of
interpersonal relationships and the developmental needs of children,
judges increasingly look[] to mental health professionals and the social sciences for help in determining the child’s best interest.” 92 The
law lacks the “capacity to supervise the delicately complex interpersonal bonds between parent and child.” 93
This autono(thee) framing is inaccurate and problematic, particularly for mothers. It feeds into a long, troublesome historical narrative of differing gendered norms and expectations of parents.94 While
the BIOC standard is unequivocally gender-neutral, social norms and
expectations still presume that mothers uniquely put the needs of
others first. 95 It uniquely requires a woman “to subordinate her own
interests and to put the children first.” 96 Mothers are uniquely “defined through an articulation of their children’s needs,” a hierarchy
which leaves a mother’s needs “occluded by the needs of her children.” 97 Mothers’ needs are thought to be actualized by the child, and
women’s needs are reframed as desires. 98 Tethering abortion decision-making to parental decision-making might powerfully expose
these differences in gender norms and align abortion decision-making
with parental decision-making in more gender-neutral ways.
Pretending that parenting is done in an autono(thee) lens also
complicates parenting framing broadly. It falsely suggests that
parenthood is a one-way street in which parents are believed to
shape and direct their children’s upbringing, but little recognition is
given to other influences, forces, or the general reciprocal nature of
family relationships. Anne-Marie Ambert’s research in The Effect of
Children on Parents, concludes that “[t]his perspective has too frequently resulted in a narrow interpretation of family dynamics emphasizing the effect that parents have on their offspring without regard for other, more potent influences on children.” 99 This approach
92. Elrod & Dale, supra note 48, at 384.
93. Carbone, supra note 59, at S118 (quoting Newmark v Williams, 588 A.2d 1108,
1115, 1116 (Del. 1991); Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State
Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649 n.13, 14 (1977)).
94. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION 14 (1976) (critiquing the ways in which mothering is “defined and restricted
under patriarchy”).
95. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 81.
96. DIANE RICHARDSON, WOMEN, MOTHERHOOD AND CHILDREARING 7 (1993).
97. JULIE A. WALLBANK, CHALLENGING MOTHERHOOD(S) 5 (2001).
98. Id.
99. ANNE-MARIE AMBERT, THE EFFECT OF CHILDREN ON PARENTS 13 (2d ed. 2001)
(explaining how concepts of socialization, childrearing, and child development have created
an exaggerated “parental causality in parent-child interaction and child outcomes.”). “This
approach totally ignores the larger environment in which children evolve,” and it reflects a
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ignores a “multiplicity of influences” that affect children and ignores
the impact that children have on parents. 100 Children do influence
parents in their health, place / space of their activities, employment,
finances, marital and family relationships, personalities, attitudes,
values, beliefs, life plans, and feelings of control over life.101
This legal framing of parenting as a one-way street is costly for
parents. It “has misled entire cohorts of parents into believing that
they could control their children’s future and shape its contours.” 102
Treating parenthood as a one-way street renders it not “socially
proper for parents to admit that they have problems with their children or that their children are affecting them negatively.”103 Parenting is not a one-way street of parents actualizing their children’s best
interests. It is highly contextual as explored further in Section III.C.
Indeed, both parental decision-making and women’s abortion decision-making are actually more multi-dimensional, inclusive, and
aligned than the law reflects as the next Section explores.
III. THE UNIFIED COMPLEXITIES OF FAMILY DECISION-MAKING
While legal framings of reproductive decision-making are described
as a right to privacy, the realities of that decision-making have never
been legally framed around the woman alone. Women actually make
decisions focused on their children and families and in consultation
with doctors.104 Likewise, parental decision-making also squarely considers that stable and healthy parents and family units are central to
decision-making.105 It is not accurate to frame either category of decision-making as a one-dimensional lens. Abortion decision-making is not
a mirror in which the decision-maker does exclusively what is best for
her. Likewise, parental decision-making is not a myopic outwardlooking scope in which only the children are within sight and only their
needs in the abstract are considered. Rather, family decision-making is
complex and varied. Decisions are made, not exclusively in the BIOC,
but considering complex layers of interconnectedness.106 Both catego“scientific bias” that “negates environmental, genetic, and reciprocal effects between parents and children.” Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Id. at 49-67.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id. at 68.
104. See infra section III.D.1 (analyzing how women make decisions in consultation
with others).
105. See infra section III.C (analyzing how parents can make decision in their
own interests).
106. Robert D. Hess, Approaches to the Measurement and Interpretation of ParentChild Interaction, in PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PROSPECTS
207, 207-08 (Ronald W. Henderson ed., 1981) (concluding that unique genetic linkages,
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ries of decision-making are multi-dimensional and include difficult balancing considerations of the self and others. This next Section explores
and explains this unified framing of family decision-making.

A. A Unified Model
The realities of abortion decision-making and parental decisionmaking reveal that a more unified framework governs in practice.107
The below image reveals a more accurate depiction of the decisionmaking frameworks that actually govern parenting and reproductive
decision-making—visually depicting critiques that have been raised
for some time by relational feminist accounts challenging both privacy and rights-based framings. 108 This image reveals that a unified
lens of family-based decision-making includes lenses of autono(me)
that squarely focus on the decision-maker, lenses of autono(thee) that
squarely focus on individuals other than the decision-maker, and autono(we) that focus on the interrelatedness of the family unit as a
whole. The impact of revealing a more unified model of how decisions
are made does critical work bringing parental decision-making and
women’s abortion decision-making closer together.
This unified decision-making framework stands regardless of an
individual decision-maker’s unique views on parenting or reproduction, and it de-genders decision-making. For example, a woman decision-maker who decides to continue a pregnancy can do so in an autono(me) lens that actualizes her subjective religious and moral understandings of the decision for her. She might also be understood to
make the decision in an autono(thee) lens that she perceives to actualize the best interests of the child. She might also be understood to
make the decision in an autono(we) lens that is focused on the needs

affective bonding, continuity of family ties, distribution of authority and power, social roles
and norms, and external influences upon family interaction disrupts and complicates the
academic study of family behavior).
107. See generally Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 939 (2011) (“[Abortion]
should be disposed of under the rubrics of family law, rather than the law governing the
Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
108. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2004) (exposing the inaccuracies of framing policy around the marital family
household as separate and self-sufficient, and arguing for societal organization around
caregiving relationships); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF
SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011) (describing the inadequacies of framing of autonomy as
independence in an individual rights context); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008)
(advocating for a more responsive state to the inherent and ongoing status of human
vulnerability); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989) (arguing for a new conception of autonomy in feminism).
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of her partner, parents, or other members of the family and community in a more broad and interconnected way.
In contrast, a woman decision-maker who decides to terminate a
pregnancy can be understood to make that decision in an autono(me)
lens to actualize her freedom to control her body and her reproduction. She might also be understood to make that decision in an autono(thee) lens that she perceives to actualize the best interests of
that child or another child. She might also be understood to make the
decision in an autono(we) lens that is focused on the needs of her
partner, parents, existing children, future children, or future partners in a more interconnected way. 109 The below image depicts this
unified model and its intersections.

109. See Cockrill & Weitz, supra note 42, at 18 (“[W]omen in our study considered each law
and attempted to balance the rights of women to make decisions and be informed with the
responsibility of women to make conscientious decisions for themselves and their families.”).
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B. Autono(thee) Decision-Making in Abortion
Women’s abortion decision-making, like parenting, also reflects important dimensions of the autono(thee) decision-making framework.
Research on how women actually make reproductive decisions strongly
supports this point. Nearly 60% of the women who terminate a pregnancy have already given birth to at least one child before terminating
a later pregnancy.110 One-third of the women terminating their pregnancies have had two or more children already.111 Thus, women who
are already mothers are the most likely category of women to have
abortions, by a growing margin. 112 This is often due to the crushing
financial pressures of parenthood.113 As one woman stated, “We feel we
have to choose between our unborn child and our born children.”114
Women as reproductive decision-makers “want the conditions to
be right when they do [have children], and women who already are
mothers want to care responsibly for their existing children.”115 Importantly, it is not just that they already have children in the abstract, but that they do not think that they can “have another child
without compromising the care given to the existing children.”116
Women can “often choose abortion because of their wish to be good
parents.” 117 This was distinctly revealed in the Purser v. Owens case
in which the lower court improperly took custody of the mother’s
children from her based on her decision to have a subsequent abortion.118 Women in narrative interviews regularly “deemphasized how
the physical problems [of pregnancy] interrupted their own lives or
activities and instead emphasized the impact that they had on their
abilities to care for their children that they already had.” 119 Narrative
survey respondents who already had children likewise revealed that
they had abortions to “dedicate the financial, emotional, and physical
110. Who’s Getting Abortions? Not Who You’d Think , NBC N EWS (Jan. 18,
2008, 6:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22689931/ns/health-womens_health/t/
whos-getting-abortions-not-who-youd-think/#.V1W4P1dxgUU [https://perma.cc/XFZ4-GLYL]
(noting critical racial disparities in abortion due to “hard times”).
111. Id.
112. Lauren Sandler, The Mother Majority, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2011, 4:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/10/most_surprising_abortion_statistic
_the_majority_of_women_who_ter.html [https://perma.cc/N45J-QX3A].
113. Who’s Getting Abortions? Not Who You’d Think, supra note 110.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Rachel Jones, Guttmacher Institute Researcher).
116. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 88.
117. Who’s Getting Abortions? Not Who You’d Think, supra note 110.
118. Purser v. Owens, 722 S.E.2d 225, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011); see also supra notes
15-26 and accompanying text.
119. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 90.
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resources that they had—which were often limited—to the children
whom they were already supporting.” 120
This reveals that it is a myth to pretend that all women make decisions in an individualistic lens. The National Abortion Federation
takes the myth that “[w]omen have abortions for selfish or frivolous
reasons” on directly. 121 It explains clearly that women, in reality,
“base their decision[s] on several factors, the most common being lack
of money and / or unreadiness to start or expand their families due to
existing responsibilities.” 122 In fact, 66% of women who terminate a
pregnancy plan to have children later when they are better able to
provide for their children or are in better relationships. 123 This suggests that the challenges of living up to the societal and legal demands of acting in the best interests of children is a heavy burden
that women take seriously, so seriously that it may sometimes cause
them to opt out of parenting and terminate a pregnancy.
This data suggests that abortion can be an external decision focused on the well-being of others, rather than self. Some decisionmaking frameworks governing abortion are unequivocally an autono(thee) decision-making framework, which maps and follows the
legal norms we purport to impose on parents. For some women, terminating a pregnancy is a means to ensure that they are the kind of
mothers they wanted to be (or perhaps, that the law expected them to
be) to their existing children. 124

C. Autono(me) Decision-Making in Parenting
It is likewise inaccurate to frame all parental decision-making as
exclusively child-focused. Some parental decision-making is also focused on the decision-maker parent. Sometimes the trade-offs involved in family decision-making explicitly include putting parents’
needs first. Free from state intervention, parents can—and indeed
do—sometimes subordinate their children’s interests to “the interests
of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or
guardians themselves.” 125 Parenting is not universally a self-

120. Id. at 91.
121. NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, WOMEN WHO HAVE ABORTIONS 2 (2003),
https://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/women_who_have_abortions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7R28-36XH].
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 91, 98 (summarizing how some women who terminate
pregnancies “believed that terminating the current pregnancy was the best decision to
make to be or remain a good mother”).
125. Carbone, supra note 59, at S113.
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sacrificial, myopic enterprise that systemically puts children’s needs
before all else.126 There must be a “me” in parental decision-making.
Parenting includes critical self-care. 127 Taking care of yourself is
“related to your child’s functioning in the home and provides an important contextual influence.” 128 Tending to individual needs, not just
the needs of children, includes time for oneself, time with spouses
and friends, and stress minimization.129 “[B]uilding in your own
downtime, your own social interaction, your own special routines
with your spouse or friends. . . . If you’re flat-out all the time, you’re
going to break down, or at least show the negative effects of that
stress in how you interact with your child.”130 The autono(me) components may be about self-care, but also about the advancement of
self as explored more below in the relocation cases for the purposes of
caring for others. This is reflected in the diagram above. Self-care
might reflect intersections between autono(me), autono(thee), and
autono(we), although initially understood as being about self.
While the BIOC standard is a universally accepted standard for
the state to apply, the premise that parents actually make decisions
in this lens is not universally accepted. Other jurisdictions give paramount consideration when the state is considering the children’s
welfare, but do not begin from the standpoint that parents actually
apply a BIOC analysis themselves. The paramountcy principle requires courts to consider the state’s best interests without regard to
other interests. 131 The paramountcy of putting children’s interests
before all else, however, does not universally “apply to parents or
other individuals with respect to their day to day or even long-term
decisions affecting the child.”132 This legal framework acknowledges
that parents can consider their own interests in careers, moving, and
126. See generally Naomi Cahn, State Representation of Children’s Interests, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 109, 131 (2006) (“[R]ather than the paradigmatic triangle of parents, children, and the
state, we must think of a rectangular pyramid that places children at the top, but has a
base that includes family, state, international actors, and, as the final point, civil society
and other nongovernmental actors.”).
127. FINE, supra note 84, at 154 (“It is important for family members to be aware of
their own needs within a family structure so that others can become aware and the
needs met, if appropriate. Families vary in what they do for their members in relation to
individual needs.”).
128. ALAN E. KAZDIN, EVERYDAY PARENTING TOOLKIT 138 (2013).
129. Id. at 139 (“This isn’t ‘me generation’ propaganda or ‘I come first’ selfishness; it’s what
the research on parent-child interaction tells us about the best route to effective parenting.”).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Helen Reece, Subverting the Stigmatization Argument, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y
484, 484 (1996) (explaining that section 1(1) of the Children Act of 1989 requires courts to
make the child’s welfare the court’s paramount consideration regarding the upbringing of
children and “no other interests or values may affect the decision”).
132. RICHARD WHITE ET AL., THE CHILDREN ACT IN PRACTICE 27 (4th ed. 2008).
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divorcing, for example. 133 One commentator summarizes how the
state may very well have norms that parents act in their children’s
best interests, but they are not legally enshrined:
It can hardly be argued that parents, in taking family decisions
affecting a child, are bound to ignore completely their own interests, the interests of other members of the family and, possibly,
outsiders. This would be a wholly undesirable, as well as an unrealistic objective. . . .
Those who imply that the welfare principle has this much
wider application [to parents] are really expressing the hope that
society in general, and individual adults, will, in their decisions,
feel it appropriate to act in the best interests of children, as they
see them. . . . The [Children] Act reposes a great deal of trust in
parents that they will know what is best for their children and
act accordingly. Whether this level of trust is justified by the historical record is something which at least one commentator was
quick to question. 134

These comments reveal how the legal premise that parents act exclusively in their children’s best interests may be a legal norm, but it is
not a factually descriptive account of all parental decision-making.
American family law cases also acknowledge that the focus is
more properly on parents’ interests in certain contexts. Parental relocation cases are an ideal lens to deconstruct some of the challenges
family courts face in trying to identify the outcome that is in the
BIOC because they reveal the challenges of disconnecting the children’s best interests (autono(thee)) from the parent’s interests (autono(me)). 135 They reveal the courts’ struggles with the BIOC autono(thee) framework,136 reflecting the “San Andreas Fault of children’s law” because of the deep tensions exposed. 137
Relocation cases force courts to consider the parent’s fundamental
right to travel, the BIOC, and the fundamental right of the nonrelo133. Id.
134. ANDREW BAINHAM, CHILDREN: THE MODERN LAW 45 (3d ed. 2005).
135. Linda D. Elrod, A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the Child
Emerging as the Standard for Relocation Cases, in RELOCATION ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY
CASES 29, 30 (Philip M. Stahl & Leslie M. Drozd eds., 2006) (noting that relocation cases
are some of the “knottiest and most disturbing problems”).
136. Id.
137. Jonathan Crowe & Lisa Toohey, From Good Intentions to Ethical Outcomes: The
Paramountcy of Children’s Interests in the Family Law Act, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 391, 412
(2009) (quoting Richard Chisholm, “The Paramount Consideration”: Children’s Interests in
Family Law, 16 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 87, 108 (2002)). As evidence of the challenges presented,
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers sought to draft a model relocation statute
and was unable to reach consensus on the burden of proof in these thorny cases, ultimately
proposing three different alternatives. See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
Proposed Model Relocation Act, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1998).
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cating parent to the care, custody, and control of his or her children. 138 States have resolved these competing rights differently.139
Some states elevate the children’s welfare to trump the parent’s right
to travel 140 while other states reject this hierarchy and conclude that
parents and children are on equal footing to demonstrate (using statutory factors) what is in the children’s best interests. 141 The trend
across the states is toward abandoning any presumptions favoring or
disfavoring relocation and toward a BIOC standard. 142
When this BIOC standard is applied and the state has enumerated specific factors governing relocation cases, however, notably these
factors often “stress ‘parent’ considerations such as the distance, cost
and difficulty of visitation.” 143 The American Law Institute, for example, recognizes valid reasons for a move to include being closer to
family or support, addressing health care problems, protecting the
children from harm, pursuing employment or education, uniting with
a spouse or partner pursuing employment or education, and improving quality of life for the family. 144 While framed around a BIOC
standard, these factors notably consider the needs of the parent explicitly in ways that the ordinary BIOC standard does not.
There are other contexts as well where the BIOC standard might
seem to be the most appropriate standard, but it is not what the state
actually uses. Parental discipline is a good example of this distinction. Tort law and family law protect a parent’s right to use some
physical force when disciplining a child. This right stands and remains unchanged “although pediatric and psychological studies
overwhelmingly conclude that corporal punishment does not benefit
children and can harm them.” 145 Likewise, child labor laws exempt
138. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (describing the fundamental
right to parent); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (analyzing the fundamental
constitutional rights of parents).
139. See Theresa Glennon, Divided Parents, Shared Children: Conflicting Approaches
to Relocation Disputes in the USA, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 55, 56 (2008) (noting that legislative
activity has increased considerably).
140. Elrod, supra note 135, at 32-33 (citing Minnesota as an example).
141. Id. at 33 (citing Colorado, Maryland, and New Mexico as examples).
142. Id. at 39.
143. Id. at 41. For example, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers’ factors
include “[w]hether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial party seeking relocation and the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.” Id. (providing a comprehensive list of factors).
144. Id. at 43-44 (noting that some states have approved the American Law Institute’s
list, such as Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia).
145. See HASDAY, supra note 43, at 148 (“Researchers have repeatedly found that
corporal punishment can inflict physical damage; undermine trust, confidence, self-esteem,
and mental health; impair the quality of the parent-child relationship; contribute to
delinquent, counterproductive, and antisocial behavior; and increase the chances that the
child will be violent and will accept violence as an adult.”).
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certain activities, such as farming, despite these being some of the
most dangerous jobs for children, causing catastrophic injuries. 146
There are also many contexts in which the state does not apply a
BIOC analysis, although one might seem logical or appropriate, such
as in parentage, immigration law, military service, and juvenile detention. 147 The state is also only interested in whether parents are
actually acting in the BIOC standard when conflict arises, not in the
abstract or general sense. 148
There are also examples in which the state itself has prioritized
an autono(me) lens over autono(thee). For example, some jurisdictions have created statutory presumptions favoring joint custody.149
There is a tension, however, in this presumption, which favors the
parenting rights of both parents, but may not necessarily actualize
the BIOC. 150 In lobbying efforts by the men’s rights movements for
joint custody, such efforts could certainly be framed in the BIOC using some social science research, but that research is conflicting at
best. Fights for presumptions of joint custody might also be framed in
an autono(me) lens as an exercise in parental rights under the premise that what is good for the parent is good for the child.

146. See id. at 149-50 (explaining that critics will not adopt child labor laws in these
settings because they interfere with parents’ control of their children).
147. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (concluding that the
biological daughter’s interest in having a relationship with her biological father did not merit
any finding of parentage over the claims of the marital father). See generally Christine Piper,
Child Focused Legislation: For the Sake of the Children?, in FIFTY YEARS IN FAMILY LAW 71,
71 (Rebecca Probert & Chris Barton eds., 2012) (explaining that what is in the BIOC is a
“contested area, subject to changing values, knowledge, fears and aspirations”); John A.
Lynch, Jr., Military Law: Time to Mandate Best Interests of the Child to Restrict
Deployments of Parents That Affect Preschool Children, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 148
(2015) (arguing that the BIOC standard should be considered in military deployments).
148. See Carbone, supra note 59, at 115 (clarifying that the BIOC standard does not
apply if parents meet certain minimum requirements of caring for their children).
149. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 326 (citing Minnesota as an example of a state with a
rebuttable presumption in favor of joint custody upon request of either party); see also
Children (Access to Parents) Bill 2010-1, HC Bill [174] cl. 1 (Eng., Wales, N. Ir.) (“[T]he
court must act on the presumption that the child’s welfare is best served through having
reasonable access to and contact with both parents unless exceptional circumstances are
demonstrated that such access and contact is not in the best interests of the child.”).
150. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 323-24 (quoting critics who argue that a joint custody
presumption “flies in the face of the national trend to put children first in all custody
decisions”). Some states have thus expressed a preference for joint custody, but not gone so
far as to create a rebuttable presumption. Id. at 326 (citing Kansas and Wisconsin as
examples); see, e.g., R.S. v. J.S., 457 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining how
Missouri policy encourages both parents to share in parenting decisions, but clarifying that
“[t]here is no preference for joint custody unless, in the given circumstances, it is in the
best interests of the child”). Both parents have to be willing to “share the rights and
responsibilities related to raising their children” in order for a preference of joint custody to
apply. Id. at 392 (quoting Dunkle v. Dunkle, 158 S.W.3d 823, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)).
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This tension between the constitutional rights of parents and the
BIOC standard has been revealed in Australian jurisprudence. 151 The
Family Law Act of Australia requires courts to focus on the BIOC
standard and explicitly make this the “paramount consideration.” 152
This paramountcy principle is intended to discourage excessive adversarialness and alleviate children’s harm from parental conflict.153
Yet, these good intentions are difficult to implement ethically. The
premise of the ethics of paramountcy seems to be embedded in the
idea that parents place the best interests of their children ahead of
their own. 154 This, of course, risks becoming gendered with a stronger
“social discourse which holds that women must consistently be willing to sacrifice their own interests in [favor] of their offspring’s and
that to do otherwise is to be deficient as a mother,” as noted above.155
The authors, therefore, argue that only a relatively weak interpretation of this principle can withstand ethical analysis. 156 This means
that the BIOC should be the primary factor considered, but not necessarily the only factor, thus disregarding other interests that may be
of significance.157
The question becomes how far this principle of paramountcy must
go; does it mean that parents “are not permitted to do anything that
will impinge upon the child’s best interests, regardless of its impact
on their own wellbeing”? 158 As an illustration, the authors provide an
example of parents pursuing careers or relaxation, resulting in personal gain for the parent(s), but with a slight reduction in the child’s
best interests. These types of questions run into conflict with “common-sense” understandings of parental responsibilities, by which we
allow parents to make trade-offs between their own interests and
their children’s interests. 159 Parents do have an obligation to consider
151. See Bajackson, supra note 46, at 348-51 (noting that many countries consider
Australia to be the most child-focused model, “almost to the point of being unethically
against the weight of the parents’ rights”).
152. Crowe & Toohey, supra note 137, at 391 (citing Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CA
(Austl.), to add the “paramountcy principle” in 2006).
153. Id. at 392.
154. Id. at 393.
155. Id. at 404.
156. Id. at 392. Additionally, the authors argue “that the strong approach to the
paramountcy principle violates the basic ethical principle of equal consideration, by placing
unjustified emphasis on the interests of children while arbitrarily discounting those of
other parties.” Id. at 405. Further, the authors do not argue that parents should not treat
their children more favorably than themselves, but that the courts should not enforce this
absolutely. Id. at 407.
157. Id. at 395-96. The authors conclude that the Australian courts have generally
adopted a strong interpretation. Id. at 396.
158. Id. at 408.
159. Id. at 409 (noting that this is so long as parents do consistently consider the
“child’s emotional, physical and material wellbeing”).
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their children’s welfare, but “to [conceptualize] the child’s welfare as
an overriding good to be [maximized] at the expense of all other interests is both oppressive and senseless.” 160 This is even more concerning when understood against the social backdrop in which women disproportionately bear the weight of domestic labor.161
It is inaccurate to frame all parental decision-making as always
myopically child-centered. Some decision-making is focused on the
well-being of the parents. Other decision-making is focused on the
family unit as a whole, as explored in the next Section.

D. Autono(we) Decision-Making in Abortion and Parenting
1. Autono(we) in Abortion
An autono(we) frame is a critical frame to understanding both
women’s abortion decision-making and parental decision-making. It
is perhaps the most accurate account of all family decision-making.
This is a family-centered or community-centered methodology in
which the focus is not exclusively centered on the decision-maker or
the subject of the decision. The focus is on the interconnections.
The autono(we) frame also dominates some women’s abortion decision-making. 162 Women’s abortion decision-making is, in fact, “not
individualistic or private at all,” 163 even if that was the feminist goal.
Of course, this framing has been heavily criticized as problematic and
paternalistic.164 Importantly, the constitutional cases espousing a
woman’s right to privacy did not position a woman’s right to choose
in isolation. Rather, the right was first framed in Griswold v. Connecticut as a right of marital privacy that the couple held. 165 Griswold
first articulated that this right belongs to a “married couple[]” in consultation with a doctor. 166 Roe expanded contraceptive decisional au160. Id. at 409-10.
161. Id. at 410.
162. Carol Gilligan, for example, has described how women make decisions, including
abortion decisions, based on an ethic of care and responsibility, considering their
relationships and obligations to others. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 81.
163. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 569 (2011).
164. See, e.g., id. at 595 (concluding that feminists “decry” allowing the state into the
informed consent conversation between a woman and her doctor as “paternalistic
infringement”); Lindgren, supra note 39, at 396 (“Abortion scholarship has uniformly
criticized the medical model of abortion reform for deferring women’s decisionmaking to
the judgment of physicians.”).
165. See 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
166. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“But, in any event, it is clear that the state
interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute,
which does not, like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil
sought to be dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples.”).
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tonomy to include the right to terminate a pregnancy, but importantly and critically, tethered that right to a decision in consultation with
her doctor. 167 The decision was framed as a contextual one. The Court
acknowledged that the woman would consider the possibilities of psychological harm, mental and physical health, and social stigmas, to
name a few.168 The companion case of Doe v. Bolton provided further
insight on the decision-making framework governing a woman’s right
to terminate a pregnancy. 169 Doe clarified what it means to allow an
abortion for the “health” of the mother. It read the term expansively
to include a “medical judgment [that] may be exercised in the light of
all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.” 170
The British statute discussed above likewise explicitly contemplates this contextual, family-centered framing. Those circumstances
include when two doctors agree in good faith that “continuance of the
pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman or any existing children of her family.” 171 The statute further
allows that when determining the risks, “account may be taken of the
pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.” 172
It is detrimental to the framing of women’s abortion decisionmaking to strip away relational aspects of the decision. Summarizing
a study of women with unintended pregnancies, Decoding Abortion
Rhetoric concluded that women making the decision to terminate a
pregnancy “did not generally characterize it in the abstract terms of
the public discourse, such as genetic structure, personhood, or soul,”
instead framing a relationship as a material experience and weighing
the decision from there.173 A woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy instead is often about the desire to have a “stable and loving
famil[y]” in which to raise the child, as explored above. 174

2. Autono(we) in Parenting (Family)
Parents also make decisions in an autono(we) lens. The “we” lens
can be a family-centered lens or a community-centered lens. First,
the family-centered lens: Parenting occurs in the context of a family
167. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“All these are factors the woman and her
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.”).
168. Id.
169. 410 U.S. 179, 189-92 (1973).
170. Id. at 192.
171. BURTON, supra note 30 (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. CONDIT, supra note 10, at 184.
174. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 91.
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in which people interact and interconnect.175 Parental decisionmaking occurs in the context of parents acting as parents to their
children, parents acting as children of their own parents, and parents
as individuals with interests and needs. 176 The family is an interrelated system.177 Changes in any one aspect of the system implicate
the entire system, whether those changes are external or internal,
desired or undesired. 178 In this system, parents do not make decisions
myopically focused on the children; they make decisions as “one piece
of a complex puzzle of work and family life.”179
Using the human body as an analogy, the BIOC pretends that—in
that system—the focus is exclusively on the heart, while each part
actually feeds and nourishes the health of the other. 180 Or, as Helen
Reece articulated: “[I]t does not follow that in order to protect a child
adequately his or her welfare must be the sole consideration.” 181 Rather, consider a mother attempting to cross the street safely with her
three kids of different ages. Her attention will not be on one child
alone, but instead, on trying to get the whole family across safely.182

3. Autono(we) in Parenting (Community)
Family decision-making regularly involves difficult trade-offs among
family members that require consideration of the entire family unit.183
Parents are “able to balance the interests of their multiple children,
and the mere fact that their obligations to multiple children conflict
should not in itself disqualify their judgment.”184 Rather, the relationships they have with their caregivers shape their decision-making

175. FINE, supra note 84, at 151 (“A family is really a system in the ways that the parts
of the family interact. Each family member takes on a role, has certain relationships with
other family members, and performs certain activities in relation to the family.”).
176. BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OURSELVES AND OUR CHILDREN: A
BOOK BY AND FOR PARENTS 154-55 (1978).
177. See id. at 156.
178. FINE, supra note 84, at 152.
Families are complex systems because many things may be happening and
changing simultaneously. Not only are the children growing and changing in
different ways, but so are the parents as individuals and as a couple; in addition there are many external pressures on a family coming from the economy
and the community.

Id. at 154.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Sosinsky, supra note 90.
BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 176, at 156.
JONATHAN HERRING ET AL., GREAT DEBATES IN FAMILY LAW 80 (2012).

Id.
Carbone, supra note 59, at S118-19.
Id. at S119.
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heavily.185 “The best interest of the child standard can only advance
children’s interests when it is sensitive to the importance of the family
in creating the context in which children experience the world.”186
The realities of parental decision-making are much more contextual and family-centered than an autono(thee) lens alone would suggest. Revisiting Troxel, it is too myopic to pretend that Tommie was
considering her children with Brad without other factors coming into
play. For example, she was thinking about her children at issue in
the case, herself and her spouse, and the larger family unit. It was
more contextual and interconnected than a narrow focus on these
children at the exclusive deprivation of all others. The Troxel decision recognized that “the stories of real families are messy—full of
conflict, separation, and melding—and that those families still deserve to be protected by the Constitution.” 187 Families differ from
household to household and there is “no single ‘normal family.’ ” 188 In
striking down the statute, the Court held that “Tommie was entitled
to make decisions about what was in her girls’ best interest within
their web of familial relations.” 189 It protected Tommie’s right to
make decisions “for the family that she forged in the crucible of multiple relationships and multiple divorces.” 190
Relocation cases are also a powerful example of the familycentered lens. Acknowledging the autono(we) lens, in at least one Arkansas case, the court explicitly held that the standard for child custody was the BIOC standard but that the standard for relocation cases was the “best interests of the family unit as a whole.”191 The court
explained that the chancellor was to consider the request to relocate
by determining whether “such a move is in the best interests of the
family unit as a whole.” 192 Other courts do not explicitly use the term
“best interests of the family,” but they are clear that “the best interest of the child can never be determined in a vacuum without considering the other members of the family. The circumstances and wellbeing of the parents are inextricably entwined with the best interest
of the child.” 193 To underscore its point, the court explained that,
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Dubler, supra note 65, at 111.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Vo v. Vo, 79 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). This was eventually replaced
with a presumption in favor of relocation for the custodial parent. See Hollandsworth v.
Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 663 (Ark. 2003) (putting the burden on the noncustodial parent to rebut the presumption).
192. Vo, 79 S.W.3d at 392.
193. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 970 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Nev. 1998).
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technically, if the needs and circumstances of divorcing parents were
entirely irrelevant, some divorces should not even be granted.194
Likewise, if the needs of parents are not considered, motions to relocate would rarely be granted because it is almost always in the BIOC
to be in close physical proximity to both parents.195
Distinctions in Louisiana law between how courts handle children
in a divorce compared to how courts handle the marital home also
reveal the inaccuracy effectively. The Louisiana code states that determinations regarding the family home must be made using the
“best interest of the family” standard, considering the economic status of the spouses and the needs of the children. 196 “Ordinarily, occupancy by the spouse who has custody of the children is in the best
interest of the family.” 197
Parental decision-making also occurs in a community-centered
lens where parents seek to actualize what the community concludes
is best, which is not necessarily the same as what is in the best interests of particular children. Social values theory, for example, concludes “that decisions for others are based more on perceptions of social norms than are self decisions.” 198 Some parenting studies support
this method of decision-making by parents. Research suggests that
parents actually make decisions “based on what they perceive that
their peer group values and thinks should be done,” which is a very
different lens than a myopic child-centered, individualistic analysis.199 This research suggests that parenting occurs in an ongoing exchange of information from parents to advisers in the context of relationships in which each person is also influenced by their perceptions
of “the other’s capacity and motives, of what each should contribute,
of what each can ask for or speak about.”200
It is a myth that parents exclusively and myopically always make
decisions in an autono(thee) lens.201 The realities of parental decision194. Id. (noting that this is not “the law nor public policy”). See generally Michael E.
Lamb, Placing Children’s Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans,
10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 98, 98 (2002) (explaining that many family interventions are
“justified by reference to children’s best interests,” but they are not grounded in
“reference[s] to developmental theory or the results of scientific research”).
195. McGuinness, 970 P.2d at 1079.
196. Bridges v. Bridges, 33 So. 3d 914, 919 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing L A. STAT.
ANN. § 9:374(B) (2016)).
197. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 618 So. 2d 579, 587 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Burrell v.
Burrell, 437 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1983)).
198. Dore et al., supra note 79, at 497.
199. See id. (noting that the results of these findings can be both positive and negative).
200. Goodnow, supra note 86, at 456.
201. See MICHAEL WYNESS, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 136 (2d ed. 2012) (describing this
as the “paramount consideration of parents”).
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making are much more diverse and complex. Both parenting
and abortion decision-making also include clear autono(me) and
autono(we) framings.
IV. WHY USE PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING TO UNDERSTAND AND
SUPPORT WOMEN’S DECISION-MAKING?
Merely revealing the problematic polarizations discussed in
Sections II and III is not enough. It is time to explore and reconsider
longstanding tensions and boundaries for the specific purpose of
destigmatizing and de-essentializing abortion decision-making given
the otherwise perilous political trajectory of the reproductive rights
movement, existing tensions in the movement that clash with
pragmatic realities, and doctrinal connections. 202 Each of these
reasons for reframing abortion decision-making and aligning it with
parental decision-making are discussed below.

A. The Reproductive Rights Movement’s Trajectory
A unified approach is necessary because women’s abortion decision-making is marginalized and receding in the courts, legislatures,
and agencies, at both the federal and state level. Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt did critical work to halt the aggressive pace and
content of restrictive measures, but it did nothing to expand access,
destigmatize, or strengthen allies. 203
202. See, e.g., Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2015) (arguing that “[parental] rights are not compatible with normative
commitments to equal protection or moral equality between persons” and proposing a
“deliberate effort to roll back the substantive due process rights jurisprudence that
constitutionally enshrines parental rights of an independent vitality separate from those
that follow from children’s rights and interests”).
203. In March 2016, the United States Supreme Court considered its first major
abortion case in a decade. Whole Woman’s Health examined just how far a state could go
in passing legislation purportedly to benefit women’s health within the parameters set
out in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. See Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). This case came at a particularly
volatile time for the Supreme Court in the wake of Justice Scalia’s passing, and renewed
and recharged a national conversation surrounding the legality of abortion. In a 5-3
decision, the Court reaffirmed the undue burden standard set out in Casey and struck
down the admitting privileges requirement and the ambulatory-surgical center
requirements of Texas House Bill 2. Id. at 2300. The Court concluded that these
provisions created an undue burden and emphasized that the state must consider the
burdens of restrictive laws, but also the benefits provided. Id. at 2309. House Bill 2 had
not been enacted with sufficient evidence supporting benefits to women’s health. This
decision did considerable work to position abortion as a safe procedure akin to other
medical procedures, but it did not advance understanding of how and why women
terminate their pregnancies or the constitutional principles that protect their decisionmaking autonomy. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole
Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126
YALE L.J.F. 149, 149-50 (2016) (analyzing the impact of Whole Woman’s Health).
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Abortion decision-making is presently dangerously untethered
from health care.204 Abortion services are increasingly “isolated from
mainstream medicine” in who provides medical care, where the medical care is provided, and how the care is provided. 205 While 80% of
abortions were in hospitals in 1973, by 1981, stand-alone clinics outnumbered hospitals, and 15 years later, 90% of all abortions were
performed in clinics.206 This isolation has exacerbated security and
safety concerns to dangerous levels.207 The Guttmacher Institute reports that there are only 367 abortion providers in doctors’ offices nationwide, down from 700 in 1982.208 This isolation was never the
“feminist plan.” 209
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act furthered this
separation when it explicitly excluded abortion from coverage requirements, even pre-viability abortions and even when the woman’s
health is in jeopardy—a move that distanced abortion problematically from the delivery of healthcare services.210 The impact of this legislation on access was critical. Before enactment of the Affordable Care
Act, approximately 87% of private insurance plans covered abortion.211 Private and public coverage alike are dramatically reduced
today.212 Abortion care is not included as an Essential Health Benefit
that must be included in a qualifying plan.213 By 2017, federal regula-

204. See generally Lindgren, supra note 39 (analyzing the decoupling of abortion
and healthcare).
205. Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18abortion-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/SX3P-UTNE].
206. Id. (concluding that clinics “truly came to stand alone”).
207. See generally DAVID S. COHEN & KRYSTEN CONNON, LIVING IN THE CROSSHAIRS: THE
UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM (2015) (analyzing the types and extent of
harassment and terrorism as well as the strategies that providers deploy to respond).
208. Bazelon, supra note 205.
209. Id. “The clinics’ founders didn’t intend them to become virtually the only settings
for abortion services in many communities.” Id. (quoting Carole Joffe). Rather, since Roe:
[T]he shadow of the greedy, butchering “abortionist” continued to hover, and many
doctors didn’t want to stand in it. As mainstream medicine backed away, feminist
activists stepped in. They set up stand-alone clinics to care for women in their
moments of crisis. In many ways, the clinics were a rebel-sister success story.

Id. (noting that this positioned clinics as targets of extremism).
210. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1358 (describing Congress’s legislative move as a

“pariah designation”).
211. Id. at 1363.
212. Id. at 1380.
213. See Alina Salganicoff et al., Coverage for Abortion Services in Medicaid,
Marketplace Plans and Private Plans, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 20 2016),
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-inmedicaid-marketplace-plans-and-private-plans/ [https://perma.cc/R77T-75F5]. Since the
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tions require at least one multi-state plan be available on the marketplace that excludes abortion coverage, but today twenty-six states
have banned all plans participating in the state exchanges from covering abortions and six states do not formally ban coverage although
no plans currently offer coverage.214
Whole Woman’s Health suggests that there is an outer boundary
in restrictive measures, but it certainly will not halt such efforts entirely. In fact, it may provide a roadmap of how to enact restrictive
measures under the guise of women’s health. 215 On the state level,
the drumbeat of restrictive measures had increased in pace and volume to a deafening level leading up to Whole Woman’s Health. 216
These restrictive measures are distinctly stigmatizing and demonizing. 217 They create a framework of “abortion exceptionalism.” 218
Kaiser report, Texas has since become the twenty-sixth state to ban plans participating in
the state exchange from offering abortion coverage See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 1696.002.
214. See sources cited supra note 213. (leaving seventeen states and the District of
Columbia to not ban coverage and include at least one plan with coverage and two states in
which there is no ban and all plans offer coverage).
215. See, e.g., Ryland Barton, Ky. Lawmaker Still Wants Abortion Restrictions After
SCOTUS Ruling, 89.3 WFPL (June 27, 2016), http://wfpl.org/supreme-court-abortionruling-lawmaker/ [https://perma.cc/AM36-VWCL].
216. This increase followed the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) decision. “The framework these Justices crafted allowed states
more latitude to restrict abortion in the interest of protecting potential life, but only as long
as women could make the ultimate decision whether to continue a pregnancy.” Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health”
Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1431 (2016); see, e.g., S. 152, 2016 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016) (amending the state’s informed consent law to require a physician
consultation by video or in person twenty-hour hours before pregnancy termination); S.
1552, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2016) (subjecting medical practitioners to loss of licensure
for abortion, deeming the procedure “unprofessional conduct”); H.R. 2568, 82nd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (banning abortion after twenty weeks in the Pain Capable Unborn
Child Protection Act; H.R. 1411, 118th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016) (precluding abortion
providers from receiving Medicaid funding); Amber Phillips, 14 States Have Passed Laws
This Year Making It Harder to Get an Abortion, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/01/14-states-have-passedlaws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-already-this-year/?utm_term=.d0f235d52020
[https://perma.cc/GM3R-ZHBT] (summarizing that nine states sought to ban all or most
abortions (although none were enacted), three states banned a common method of secondtrimester abortions, two states lengthened the waiting period, two states enacted twenty
week bans, and Indiana made it illegal to abort a fetus with Down Syndrome or because of
race or gender).
217. For example, in the final hours of the 2016 legislative session, Alabama passed a
law which likened abortion clinics to sex offenders by imposing the same restriction that
they cannot be within 2,000 feet of a public K-8 school. This may require two of the state’s
five clinics to close or move. See, e.g., Hannah Levintova, Alabama Passes a Bill to Regulate Abortion Clinics Like Sex Offenders, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/05/alabama-just-passed-bill-regulate-abortionclinics-sex-offenders [https://perma.cc/59ZM-5D34]. Indiana House Resolution 1137 was
perhaps one of the most notable of the 2016 legislative session on this front. See H.R.
1337 § 11(b), 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016); H.R. 1337 § 22(9)(a), 119th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016). This law states that a “health care facility hav-
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These laws target abortion for “burdensome, health-justified restrictions not imposed on other medical procedures of similar
risk.” 219 These laws regulate the licensing of clinics, the qualifications of doctors, reporting requirements, informed consent rules, and
pharmaceutical limitations. 220 In 2011 alone, for example, 92 restrictive abortion measures passed in state legislatures, reflecting a
three-fold increase since 2005. 221 Then, in just the first half of 2012,
another 39 restrictive laws were passed at the state level. 222 By
2015, “57% of women live[d] in states considered to be ‘hostile’ or ‘extremely hostile’ to reproductive rights.” 223
The impact of all of these restrictive measures is very real for
women’s access to reproductive care. The impact is logistical, geographical, financial, and psychological. 224 This geographic hardship
was particularly poignant following Texas House Bill 2.225
These restrictive measures are particularly challenging for lowincome women who face a “three-front war in reproductive
health.” 226 Low-income women have fewer resources for contraception to avoid unintended pregnancies, they are less likely to have
abortion coverage because Medicaid “almost never” provides coving possession of a miscarried fetus shall provide for the final disposition of the miscarried fetus” and creates criminal, civil, and licensing accountability for “knowingly or intentionally perform[ing] an abortion in violation” of these requirements. IND. CODE
§§ 16-25-4.5(3), 16-34-4(9)(a)-(b) (2016).
218. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 216, at 1447.
219. Id. at 1430.
220. Id.
221. Amber Phillips, Three States’ Abortion Laws Just Fell Thanks to the
Supreme Court. These States Could Be Next., W ASH. P OST (June 28, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/how-many-states-could-see-theirabortion-restrictions-struck-down-after-the-supreme-courts-big-ruling/?utm_term=.c5902760c06f.
222. Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Democracy, and the “War on Women,” 32
LAW & INEQ. 1, 8 (2014).
223. Christina Cherel, Holding the Line: Challenges to Reproductive Rights in 2016,
NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nwhn.org/holding-the-linechallenges-to-reproductive-rights-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/WW9D-3VPW] (noting that
thirteen states were considered hostile in 2000).
224. Caitlin Gerdts et al., Impact of Clinic Closures on Women Obtaining Abortion
Services After Implementation of a Restrictive Law in Texas, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 857,
857 (2016) (finding that overall 36% of women whose nearest clinic had closed said the
burdens associated with obtaining the service was difficult, while only 18% of women said
the same when their nearest clinic had not closed, reflecting a 50% increase).
225. After the Texas legislature passed House Bill 2, the average one-way distance to
find an abortion provider increased from 22 miles to 85 miles. Id. at 861. Twenty-five
percent of Texas women would have to travel a distance of 139 miles one-way, and 10% of
Texas women would have to travel a distance of 256 miles one-way. Id. Even Whole
Woman’s Health alone only challenged the most restrictive components of the Texas
abortion regulations.
226. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1380.
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erage, and they are less likely to find a doctor because few doctors
even participate in Medicaid. 227
Many of the legislative attacks in 2015 and 2016 focused particularly on defunding and delegitimizing Planned Parenthood. In 2015,
Congress actively sought to defund Planned Parenthood. 228 Defund
Planned Parenthood legislation passed in states such as Ohio, Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, and Utah—thereby restricting the flow of state funds to
Planned Parenthood. 229
For the reproductive rights movement, preserving the status quo
was the “Alamo” in Whole Woman’s Health. Whether it can be used
meaningfully to improve the legal status of women’s health or access
to reproductive care as compared to stopping the enablement and
empowerment of more unfounded restrictions being enacted at the
state level remains to be seen. 230 Whole Woman’s Health takes a critical step forward, but it does not speak to why this decision is so important for women, how women make the decision, and the centrality
of the decision to women’s overall political and social equality. Rather, it speaks almost exclusively to the actions and methodologies of
legislatures. The overall trajectory of the social, political, and legal
227. Id. In comparison, in England and Wales, for example, 98% of all abortions in 2015
were publicly funded. See U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND
WALES: 2015 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/529344/Abortion_Statistics_2015_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9KF-PXRA].
228. Defund Planned Parenthood Act of 2015, H.R. 3134, 114th Cong. § 2(3) (2015)
(“All funds that are no longer available to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.
and its affiliates and clinics pursuant to this Act will continue to be made available to other
eligible entities to provide women’s health care services.”).
229. Leah Jessen, Since the Release of Undercover Videos, 8 States Have Defunded
Planned Parenthood. Ohio Makes It 9., DAILY SIGNAL (Feb. 12, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/
2016/02/12/since-the-release-of-undercover-videos-8-states-have-defunded-planned-parenthoodohio-makes-it-9/ [https://perma.cc/GMH3-ZEFD]; see, e.g., S.B. 44, 1st Spec. Sess. § 1(a)
(Ala. 2015) (“No person, entity, or association shall offer money or anything of value for an
aborted fetus or any portion of an aborted fetus; nor shall any person, entity, or association
accept any money or anything of value for an aborted fetus or any portion of an aborted
fetus.”); S.B. 569, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (Ark. 2015) (“[P]ublic dollars made
available . . . through the State . . . may be awarded to an entity that performs elective
abortions or subsidizes or otherwise facilitates the entity’s ability to perform elective abortions although the funds were not disbursed specifically for the purpose of performing elective abortions . . . .”); S.B. 214, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016) (“ensur[ing] that
state funds and certain federal funds are not used either to perform or promote nontherapeutic abortions, or to contract or affiliate with any entity that performs or promotes nontherapeutic abortions”). Some of these statutes may be appealed.
230. Molly Redden, Planned Parenthood: Eight States Now Striving to Repeal Abortion
Restrictions, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/
30/planned-parenthood-state-repeal-abortion-restrictions [https://perma.cc/Y3JH-8M6V]
(“Lawmakers are formulating specific plans to target similar abortion restrictions in Arizona,
Pennsylvania and Virginia, and they are broadly prepared to repeal laws in Florida, Michigan
and Texas.”). Other anticipated challenges are in Tennessee and Missouri.
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framing of reproductive decision-making remains perilous and marginalized.231 Thus, crossing longstanding boundaries may be necessary to move the movement forward.

B. Pragmatic Realities
Acknowledging the risks of crossing these longstanding boundaries,
the costs of retaining the boundaries are also worthy of discussion.232
Existing critiques have explained how the language of choice provided
a powerful rationale for states to not fund abortion healthcare.233
The boundaries that are well drawn in the reproductive rights debate are not pragmatic either. “Pro-life” advocates frame their arguments around the language of personhood, children, parenthood, and
life. 234 “Pro-choice” advocates frame their arguments around choice,
autonomy, health, decision-making, and women’s rights.235 They consciously avoid the parent / child framing for political and strategic
reasons. 236 These boundaries are black and white; the “third rail” of
231. See, e.g., Susan Decker, Donald Trump Intent on Overturning Supreme Court
Abortion Ruling, DALL. NEWS (Nov. 2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/

2016/11/13/donald-trump-intent-overturning-supreme-court-abortion-ruling.
232. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 26, at 1584 (“[C]urrent abortion rights rhetoric carries
significant costs. The need to reassess that rhetoric seems particularly pressing today.”).
233. See, e.g., CONDIT, supra note 10, at 201; Lindgren, supra note 39, at 414 (“By
severing both private and state health insurance funds for abortion, these laws isolate
abortion as fundamentally different in kind from healthcare and a luxury that must be
paid for from private funds.”).
234. See, e.g., National Right to Life Mission Statement, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE,
http://www.nrlc.org/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/M8EE-QRVR] (“The mission of National
Right to Life is to protect and defend the most fundamental right of humankind, the right to
life of every innocent human being from the beginning of life to natural death.”).
235. See, e.g., Our Mission, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://prochoice.org/about-naf/
[https://perma.cc/QG6W-93RQ] (“The mission of the National Abortion Federation is to
ensure safe, legal, and accessible abortion care, which promotes health and justice for
women.” (emphasis omitted)).
236. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Reply, Burying Best Interests of the Resulting Child: A Response to Professors Crawford, Alvaré, and Mutcherson, 97 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 10
(2012) (noting that there is sensitivity to language of “resulting children” when discussing reproductive decision-making and that this language may be “misused by . . . political opponents,”
but concluding that “[s]ometimes we must press forward in an intellectually honest way even if
our arguments will be co-opted by those we disagree with”); How Do I Know If I’m Having a
Miscarriage?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/pregnancy/
miscarriage/how-do-i-know-if-im-having-miscarriage [https://perma.cc/EXZ3-HFNN] (explaining
that miscarriage may cause a “mix of emotions, including disappointment, despair, shock, guilt,
grief, and relief” and that this range of emotions is normal). “Take care of yourself physically and
emotionally, and give yourself permission to grieve your loss if you need to. Grief and sadness
are very normal responses to miscarriage.” Id.; see also Miscarriage and Fetal Anomaly Support,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://patients.pposbc.org/miscarriage-support/ (last visited Sept. 5,
2016) (“Many families have found creating tangible memories to be helpful and comforting as
they grieve the loss of their pregnancy. Rituals and keepsakes that speak to your personal experience can help bring about closure for those who wish to say goodbye. Below we have included a
handful of ideas that other families have used to honor the pregnancy.”).
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advocacy. 237 Crossing those boundaries, even an inch, is considered to
concede too much on either side of the debate. 238
The language of “choice” simply does not resonate with all women’s
experiences, particularly for women terminating for reasons of medical
necessity.239 The language of “life,” in turn, compromises the understanding of women’s health risks in pregnancy and erases the life of
the pregnant woman from the frame. 240 The language of choice purports to be gender-neutral, allowing all adults to be self-interested, but
“the ideology of conventional femininity condemns mothers who pursue self-interest over their children’s needs as ‘selfish.’ ” 241 These
boundaries essentialize women’s experiences as decision-makers.242
The troublesome way in which the Court’s rhetorical shift to
“mother” and “unborn child” from “pregnant woman” and “fetus” in
Gonzales v. Carhart was used exploitatively and emotively is an
example of the deep dangers associated with any shifts. 243 In con237. The “third rail” refers to a highly charged rail that powers a train and could be
dangerous, if not lethal, to touch. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Regulation Reproduction: The
Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 426 (2011) (critiquing the role that the
BIOC analysis plays in regulating reproductive rights).
One way of understanding the prominence of [Best Interests of the Resulting
Children] justifications for the regulation of reproduction, then, is as
transposition of reasoning from family law into the law of reproduction. The
analogy goes: protecting the best interests of existing children is to the
constitutional protections against interference in child rearing and legal
parenthood (family autonomy) as protecting the best interests of resulting
children is to the constitutional protections against interference in reproductive
decisions (reproductive autonomy).

Id. at 435. Cohen carves out the “abortion right” as requiring a different analysis. Id. at 441.
238. See Lindgren, supra note 39, at 388 (explaining how “the Court’s current analysis

leaves access to abortion vulnerable to erosion by courts and legislatures” and the decision
between “healthcare and choice [has] become a zero-sum trade-off”).
239. See, e.g., Jeannie Ludlow, Love and Goodness: Toward a New Abortion Politics, 38
FEMINIST STUD. 474, 476 (2012) (explaining that rights and legislation seem removed from
her experience in that moment); Williams, supra note 26, at 1584 (“Yet choice rhetoric is
not the simple, unadulterated truth of women’s lives: many aborting women feel they have
no choice but to abort. The rhetoric has been strategic from the beginning, not expressive of
pristine, unchanging truths.” (footnotes omitted)).
240. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1361 (prohibiting access to abortion thus can threaten
the life of pregnant women too).
241. Williams, supra note 26, at 1561.
242. See, e.g., MCDONNELL, supra note 3, at 23 (“[W]omen’s experience of abortion is not
being addressed and integrated into the way we talk politically about the issue. . . . [H]aving
an abortion is not the straightforward exercise it sometimes appears to be in our leaflets
and slogans.”).
243. To consider examples of the concerns that reproductive rights advocates had with
the rhetorical shifts in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), see generally Maya
Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 282 (2009) (concluding that abortion law treats competent
adult women as incompetent “to make decisions about their own healthcare”); Lindgren,
supra note 39, at 413. To consider how advocates for restricting abortion understood the
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trast, Roe v. Wade, for example, described the interests of pregnant
women and potential prenatal life. 244
Parental rights and reproductive rights are also pragmatically interconnected because the exercise of a woman’s right to decide to
terminate a pregnancy is most notably an exercise of her decision on
whether to be a parent at that point in her life. 245 She is deciding
whether to forego parenting, defer parenting to a later point, or become a parent now. It is only logical that in making this decision she
would be analyzing what the state expects of her in terms of how she
would parent and the relationship that she would (should) have with
her child, a point which is explored further below. To the extent that
the state will apply parenting standards that the pregnant woman
does not believe she is able to meet, that is a critical way in which
parental decision-making is deeply relevant to abortion decisionmaking. If the state expects her to act always in her children’s
best interests and will judge her unfit otherwise, that is a critical,
pragmatic intersection.
The state also holds tremendous power over both types of decisionmaking, as compared to other types of decision-making (for example,
healthcare, employment, or financial). While states certainly regulate
healthcare, employment, and finances, the power of the state to terminate parental relationships or to implicitly compel one to
parenthood is a distinctly unique power. The BIOC standard is often
understood as a considerable “trump” to supersede parental authority. The state, for example, plays a parens patriae role to protect children in certain contexts. 246 It is defined as a “sovereign right and duty [of the state] to care for a child and protect him from neglect,
abuse and fraud during his minority.” 247 Roe likewise espoused a
state’s interest in acting on behalf of “protecting prenatal life.” 248 As
discussed above, the state intervenes in innumerable ways to regulate and restrict the abortion decision-making of women. Thus, both
types of state action are to override individual decision-making.
case and its rhetorical shifts, see Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion
Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 411 (2008) (arguing that
Gonzales “created abortion law that looks and feels like family law”).
244. 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
245. See generally Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the
Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 329 (2010) (positioning abortion
as a range of reproductive rights, rather than an isolated right to put reproductive rights
on “firmer footing”).
246. Cahn, supra note 126, at 109, 112.
247. Carbone, supra note 59, at S115. This state role has “been more presumed than
explored” and the “parameters of that role, are somewhat obscure.” Cahn, supra note 126,
at 109, 112 (noting, however, that it has been explored more in the foster care system).
248. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (noting that “some phrase it in terms of duty”).
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It is unrealistic to think that the state builds boundaries and
walls around its power to intervene on behalf of children and its power to intervene on behalf of potential life. 249 It is also unrealistic to
think that women universally build and retain these boundaries.250
The contours of the state’s power to trump parental decision-making
is deeply connected comparatively to understanding the scope of the
state’s power in regulating women’s abortion decision-making.251

C. Doctrinal Connections
A unified approach also aligns with the doctrinal framings of the
right to privacy governing women’s abortion decision-making. Notably, the trajectory of the rights for parents remains much more stable
and protected than reproductive rights. Parents play a primary role
raising their children and that right is constitutionally protected,252
but it is not absolute.253 Parents in intact families are presumed to
act in the children’s best interests, and their child-rearing decisions
receive “special weight.” 254 This is a unique aspect of constitutional
law and family law and one that merits strategic consideration in the
modern and perilous reproductive rights advocacy conversation.
The roots of the right to privacy include critical strands of parental decision-making. The right to privacy that prohibits the state
from improperly infringing on a woman’s right to decide whether to
bear or beget a child as articulated in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe,
relied heavily on the parental decision-making cases of Meyer and
Pierce. In a pair of Lochner-era cases, the United States Supreme
Court first held that parents hold a fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of their children. First, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
249. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 126, at 132 (“The state’s claim that it can represent
children’s interests plays a significant role in defining the structure of families, the relationships within families, and the development of children’s interests.”).
250. MCDONNELL, supra note 3, at 80 (“We can no longer talk about ‘choice’ in a
vacuum. We must talk about the right to have as well as not have children.”).
251. Carbone, supra note 59, at S113.
252. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.”). The Supreme Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska that the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment “[w]ithout doubt” included “the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . to marry, establish a home and bring
up children.” 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
253. See, e.g., Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he State
may limit parental rights in a number of ways, including prohibiting the abuse or neglect
of children, regulating child labor, requiring children to be vaccinated, requiring school
attendance, and requiring that children be restrained while riding in motor vehicles.”).
254. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58-59 (2000) (striking down a statute allowing
any person at any time to petition for visitation of the biological mother’s children).
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States Constitution provides “freedom from bodily restraint” as well
as the freedom to marry, “establish a home and bring up children.”255
The Court held that the state had improperly infringed on these liberties when it prohibited the teaching of foreign language to certain
children in schools. 256 It concluded that “[w]ithout doubt, [the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes . . . the right
of the individual to . . . bring up children . . . [and] to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 257
In 1925, the Supreme Court reaffirmed these protections in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, holding that “[t]he child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”258 Meyer and Pierce, however, had doctrinal limitations in their longevity because they were also very much about the
contractual and property rights of the teachers to earn a living, and
the Court was striking down laws with strong nativist implications. In
time, however, the rights of parents to the custody, care, and control of
their children set out in Meyer and Pierce were reaffirmed in later decisions that were free from the critiques of Lochner-era cases.259
Griswold v. Connecticut is the doctrinal bridge that first connected
the parental decision-making cases to reproductive decision-making
under a unified lens of family. In Griswold, the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives. It
cited the above cases outlining the rights of parents to make decisions related to the care, custody, and rearing of their children. 260 Legally, however, the reproductive rights arguments were channeled
into a right-to-privacy frame following Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe
255. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
256. Id. at 400 (concluding that the statute was arbitrary and “without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect”).
257. Id. at 399 (defining the right as a fundamental liberty interest).
258. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (upholding a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of a compulsory education law). The Oregon statute at issue
required parents and guardians with control or custody of children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to send the children to public school or face misdemeanor penalties. Id. at 510.
259. In 1944, for example, the Court held that “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can neither supply nor hinder.”
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held
that “the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their
children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.” 406 U.S. 205,
213-14 (1972). It held that the strong tradition of parental concern for the nurturing and
“upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate.” Id. at 232.
260. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (“Without those
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the principle
of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.”).

1324

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1281

v. Ullman. 261 The right to privacy, critically, protected the marital

couple from government intrusion into procreative decisionmaking. 262 Eisenstadt then expanded that right to individuals based
on an equal protection challenge. It held that “[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.” 263
Roe v. Wade affirmed the shared doctrinal roots of abortion decision-making with parental decision-making. When the Court in Roe
considered the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, the
Court held:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 264

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe. It did so in a way
that also reaffirmed the interconnectedness of abortion decisionmaking and family decision-making as well. The plurality tethered
the right to terminate a pregnancy to broader concepts of autonomy
and dignity when it stated, “These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 265
261. 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (striking down a challenge to the same Connecticut law
challenged in Griswold, but concluding that that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the law). Justice Harlan’s dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process clause was broad enough to include the liberty interests violated here. Id. at
523 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This approach is limited because it “cannot accommodate
the fact that many people rely on government support for their daily activities, whether
they be education (e.g., student loans), family formation (e.g., tax credits), or
employment.” Luna & Luker, supra note 6, at 329.
262. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. Justice Douglas, writing for the Griswold majority,
positioned the right to privacy within the “penumbras” and “emanations” of other
constitutional rights. Id. at 484. Concurring opinions placed the right to privacy in the
Ninth Amendment to the Constitution (Justice Goldberg) and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment (Justice Harlan). See id. at 486-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring),
499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
263. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down the statute on equal
protection grounds).
264. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
265. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). The decision
positions a pregnant woman with decision-making autonomy, but also considerably empowered the state to persuade and “inform” that decision. The opinion expressed a “pro-
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The bridge between parental decision-making and reproductive
decision-making was reaffirmed in Troxel v. Granville, but Troxel
also showed the enduring protections given to parental rights. In
2000, the Supreme Court, citing the previous lineage of cases, held in
Troxel that the liberty interests of parents and guardians protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “includes
the right ‘to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.’ ” 266 It held that for fit parents “there will normally be
no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of the parent’s children.” 267 The
Court thus reaffirmed the positioning of parental decision-making as
a constitutionally protected right that is doctrinally aligned in the
source of the right (the right to privacy) with the decision to terminate a pregnancy.268 As Jill Hasday concludes in Family Law Reimagined, “change in family law’s treatment of the parent-child relationship has not been nearly as dramatic or far-reaching as stories about
the modern preeminence of children’s interests might suggest.” 269 Rather, parental rights are protected in many contexts, including the
constitutional protections noted above. 270
Notably, as uncomfortable as it might be for the reproductive
rights movement to acknowledge, this positions the constitutional
jurisprudence of abortion as doctrinally tethered closer to parental
rights (and thus, to family law) than it is to women’s constitutional
equality. That was never the feminist plan, but it is the current reality. Women’s reproductive decision-making remains untethered explicitly from equal protection arguments—a point many feminist

found interest in potential life” that supported the enactment of state laws throughout a
woman’s pregnancy. Id. at 878. The “means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it” and the
state cannot impose an “undue burden” on the woman’s decision. Id. at 877. An undue burden is a “state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id. Whole Woman’s
Health clarified that an undue burden requires the state to consider the burdens a law
imposes on women, but also the benefits that it offers to women; laws that are not medically justified will not stand.
266. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925)).
267. Id. at 68-69.
268. This doctrinal framing might be surprising to some. Notably missing is legal analysis of reproductive rights as women’s rights. The doctrinal underpinnings of reproductive
rights align more closely with the rights of parents than they do with the rights of woman
under the Equal Protection Clause.
269. See HASDAY, supra note 43, at 135.
270. See id.
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scholars have critiqued for decades.271 Women were protected from
some aspects of government regulation, but the basis for this protection was not about women making autonomous decisions or achieving
equal political status.272 Rather, the right was about freedom from
government intrusion into private matters.
The absence of the parallel equal protection frame became particularly noteworthy after Obergefell v. Hodges and United States v.
Windsor. 273 These cases struck down state bans on same-sex marriage and federal bans on the recognition of valid same-sex marriages, respectively, using a “helix” of both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 274 Reproductive
rights, critically, only hold one strand of the helix in current constitutional doctrine.

D. The Intersection of Family Law and Reproductive Rights
The polarization described above leaves abortion decision-making
in a tenuous and untethered place in the field of family law. A simple
web search for “reproductive rights” yields no references to families
whatsoever without extensive and prolonged digging. The key results
focus on, for example, nonprofit groups working on reproductive
rights, news about state legislative activity, historical chronologies of
the movement. The notion of “family” is simply missing from social,
legal, and political framings of abortion. Interestingly, it is largely
missing from both the “choice” and the “life” sides of the debate. In
contrast, simple web searches for “family law” yield innumerable
links to law practitioners, resources and tools to work through family
law issues, and pages for local bar sections. The social, political, and
legal framing of family law is likewise missing conception, reproduction, and abortion.
Scholars and casebook authors typically consider reproductive
rights as a subset of family law, but primarily in the area of constitutional law. Most family law casebooks use a constitutional lens to set
the outer boundaries of how far the state can go in regulating the

271. See Bachiochi, supra note 107, at 889 n.3 for a list of sources arguing that the
abortion right should be based in equal protection. For a chronology of equal protection
cases and scholarly debate about the Equal Protection Clause argument’s role in abortion,
see id. at 898-907.
272. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1372 (“[W]omen qua women are absent from the
Court’s analyses.”).
273. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (striking down state bans on samesex marriage); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down provisions
of the Defense of Marriage Act).
274. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
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family.275 The right to access contraception and the right to terminate
a pregnancy are presented, but they are presented as an outer
boundary to state power—set distinctly apart from the decisionmaking roles of parents and the BIOC standard. 276 This leaves the
impression that reproductive rights abstractly are a chapter of family
law, but that they do not bear a connection to the way we think about
parenting and family decision-making more broadly.
Reproductive rights scholarship also has a tenuous relationship to
family law scholarship. While family law conferences will accept papers about reproductive rights, they are generally segmented off as a
subset of the field. Law conferences routinely bifurcate papers on reproductive rights from those on parenting, custody, or visitation.
There are separate blogs, separate casebooks, 277 separate courses,
and separate fields of scholarship. A unified framing of reproductive
and parental decision-making would also more cohesively position
reproductive rights as a field that is interconnected with family law.
V. CONCLUSION
Conventional approaches have positioned reproductive rights as
distinct from parental rights. Any alignment is something that the
reproductive rights movement has historically resisted squarely. 278 It
has resisted this alignment for fear that it compels the personhood of
the fetus or the parental status of the woman decision-maker. This
hardline approach may be too cautious or too all-encompassing.
There may be critical gains to using a unified approach to understanding the decision-making methodologies of parents and women
making reproductive decisions. To deny this alignment with parental
decision-making entirely is also to compromise the identities of other

275. See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (6th ed. 2016). Chapter 1 describes the constitutional protections
for the family and its members. Id. The content on reproduction is there to frame the power
of the state. It is not connected to parenting per se or to the decision to become a parent. It
is about state power.
276. Compare DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 2012),
and IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2010)
(beginning the respective texts with a chapter on marriage, family, and privacy and ending
with content on ART and adoption), with HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2013) (embedding chapters on “Becoming a Parent:
Contraception, Abortion, and Paternity,” “Adoption,” “Assisted Reproduction,” and “Child,
Parent, and State: Rights and Obligations” in the heart of the doctrinal material).
277. A pioneering textbook on reproductive rights was published in 2015. See MELISSA
MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (2015). This
book signals the importance of the field of reproductive rights.
278. See supra Section II.A.
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decision-makers who do think in these terms.279 It allows oppositional
groups to demonize, marginalize, and distance the decision-making of
women over their reproduction from the ordinary decision-making of
others. It compromises empathy. It fosters isolation and loneliness. 280
Expanding our understandings of abortion decision-making to include autono(thee) and autono(we) results in a more inclusive feminist account of abortion decision-making.281 It builds on liberal notions of autonomy, but also builds in space for other framings. Feminists have historically been “wary of reliance on liberal notions of individualistic choice to promote autonomy and equality.” 282 Feminists
have critiqued liberal autonomy as marginalizing “interdependence
and care,” 283 instead emphasizing how liberal politics must be “sensitive to relations of care, interdependence, and mutual support that
define our lives and which have traditionally marked the realm of the
feminine.” 284 Some feminist strands instead emphasize a relational
autonomy model that “optimiz[es] autonomous decision making
through dialogue and explicit recognition of social and contextual
pressures involved in choice.” 285 This approach acknowledges that
autonomy occurs “within and because of relationships.” 286 This is a
more dynamic concept of autonomy in which one’s autonomy is actualized in the context of relationships and others. 287
279. See, e.g., Ludlow, supra note 239, at 476 (explaining that the language of
“autonomy and choice” does not resonate with “many women” who have had abortions
because their lives are complex and they are focusing on their families and their lives).
280. This is a point which reproductive rights groups, such as the Abortion Care
Network, have tried to counter with publicity campaigns and supportive materials
emphasizing “[y]ou are a good woman” or that “[g]ood women have abortions.” Id. at 478-79
(noting as well that there might be a normative critique to feminists being concerned with
“good women”).
281. See generally Smith, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that Justice Kennedy does
not understand or relate to abortion decision-making and that he “imagines [it] as a
process that results in the loss of maternal bliss”). Smith argues that there is a significant
lack of information about the process of abortion decision-making, which fuels
misinformation and beliefs that the decisions are “irrational and selfish.” Id.
282. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 163, at 608; Williams, supra note 26, at 1561
(“A more accurate understanding of liberalism would recognize the way it excludes mothers
from the republic of self-interested choice, mandating selflessness for mothers and selfinterest for others.”).
283. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 163, at 608, 610 (‘ “Relational autonomy’ provides an
alternative understanding of autonomy that acknowledges the many social and contextual
constraints and pressures that may be placed on choices while simultaneously recognizing
that there is value in self-determination.”).
284. John Christman, Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social
Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL. STUD. 143, 143 (2004).
285. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 163, at 611 (noting that relational autonomy focuses on
the “contextual forces that shape a decision beyond explicit coercion”).
286. Carolyn Ells et al., Relational Autonomy as an Essential Component of PatientCentered Care, 4 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 79, 86 (2011).
287. Id.
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It is dangerous and marginalizing to leave reproductive rights
dangling perilously as an offshoot of constitutional law and a
bookend of family law. Rather, it is time to embrace the doctrinal interconnections that reproductive decision-making has to parental decision-making. This is in no way to displace the critical work that
rights and autonomy framings also add to our understandings of reproductive rights, but to add depth and context to the origins of the
right and the realities of decision-making. This approach—while admittedly breaching longstanding boundaries—seeks to ultimately
build bridges, understanding, and inclusiveness to the reproductive
rights movement. 288
Positioning abortion decision-making in a unified frame with parental decision-making would powerfully debunk troublesome and
demonizing myths about why women terminate pregnancies. Reducing cultural stigma is a critical goal of the reproductive rights movement. Despite the data discussed above revealing that the typical
woman who terminates her pregnancy is already a mother, few people recognize or internalize these accounts. 289 These misperceptions
come squarely from the challenges people perceive in reconciling parenting and abortion. 290 It is hard to “demonize politically” mothers
who are making such tough choices about “low income, unemployment, and a lack of health insurance, or [who] are struggling to raise
kids on their own.” 291 It would also destigmatize certain aspects of
abortion decision-making because it would soften the perceived dissonance of women choosing not to become parents. 292
This unified framing also challenges the monopoly on morality
that the pro-life movement currently holds. It suggests that an individual’s perception of morality or religion is also a way of actualizing
one’s autono(me). This framing brings the strong religious lens and
the strong women’s autonomy lenses closer together. A religious objection to abortion can be an autono(me) decision just as a woman’s
decision to terminate can be an autono(thee) decision.

288. See generally Daniel Skinner, The Politics of Medical Necessity in American
Abortion Debates, 8 POL. & GENDER 1, 1 (2012) (concluding that “medical necessity” is a

“high-stakes rhetorical contest”). “Rights discourse has historically introduced problems
such as competition among groups for the recognition and resources that rights entail,
constitutive exclusions, and the reinforcement of patriarchy.” Id. at 19.
289. Sandler, supra note 112.
290. Id. (describing it as a “terrible mistake” to “focus ‘on the less frequent reasons [for
terminating pregnancies], which are rape and incest’ ”).
291. Id. (quoting a qualitative study on why women have abortions).
292. Cahill, supra note 1, at 441 (“Her behavior causes ‘cognitive discomfort,’ if not
extreme cognitive dissonance, because it ‘confounds the general scheme of the world.’ ”
(footnotes omitted)).
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While abortion decision-making is understood as a highly politicized
and polarizing framework, a unified framework would reveal that parenting decision-making is likewise political.293 The cultural script that
we write for parents is deeply entrenched in cultural, social, and moral
expectations. 294 This script, as many feminist authors have revealed, is
not gender-neutral in the expectations it places on parents.295 When
parents, particularly mothers, do not align with this cultural script, it
can silence and isolate parents. 296 That script is also heavily grounded in
middle-class privilege, in which what “children are and need patently
reflect a white, middle-class cultural hegemony.” 297
This approach might also build new allies or empathizers. When
abortion decision-making is reframed as a contextual and relational
decision, might someone who experienced a divorce or a separation be
able to better understand the complex, contextual decision-making
that women undergo in relation to their pregnancies? 298 Might a parent who has decided not to vaccinate their children or to homeschool
their children empathize with the demonization and judgment that is
cast upon those women who elect to terminate their pregnancies?
These tethers might cross critical political and legal boundaries at
least to create understanding.
It is time to reconsider the longstanding boundaries. There may be
critical ground to be gained in exploring the complex, multidimensional realities of decision-making.

293. See generally ELDER & GREENE, supra note 87 (chronicling political emphasis on
parenthood and the family in the twenty-first century political system).
294. MILLER, supra note 83, at 13.
295. See, e.g., WALLBANK, supra note 97.
296. See MILLER, supra note 83, at 13-14; GILLIES, supra note 78, at 155 (explaining
that working-class parents expressed “silence, withdrawal, anger, aggression and
resistance” when they conflicted with their children’s teachers); RICHARDSON, supra note
96, at 3 (“Both the assumption that women have a duty to take care of their children and
the expectation that women will find motherhood naturally rewarding make it difficult for
women, as mothers, openly to express feelings of dissatisfaction and disappointment, anger
and frustration.”).
297. GILLIES, supra note 78, at 145.
298. “Yet there is no escaping the fact that abortion is frequently a painful experience
for the woman; it signifies a loss. What is interesting is that so many women choose it anyway, and are able to separate their feelings from their moral judgment about what is best
to do. As with divorce or separation, feelings about an abortion may be in conflict without
this spelling a sense of ‘guilt.’ ” ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S
CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 368 (1984).

